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THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS THEORY OF 
STANDING* 
F. ANDREW HESSICK** 
Under current law, a party must establish Article III standing to 
bring suit in federal court. According to the Supreme Court, this 
standing requirement is necessary to protect the separation of 
powers. It does so by limiting the judiciary to its historical role, 
preventing the judiciary from resolving disputes better suited to 
the other branches, protecting the legitimacy of the courts, and 
restraining Congress from empowering the judiciary to usurp the 
role of the Executive. This Article argues that these separation-
of-powers rationales do not apply to all types of disputes. In 
particular, they do not apply to suits by private individuals 
asserting the violation of private rights, nor do they apply to suits 
seeking to force state officials to act or seeking to exercise a 
power held by state officials. Dispensing with standing in those 
cases would remove an unwarranted obstacle to relief for 
similarly situated plaintiffs, make standing more conceptually 
coherent, and invigorate standing doctrine in cases that do 
present salient threats to the other branches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to 
deciding only “cases” and “controversies.”1 The Supreme Court has 
developed a number of doctrines implementing this provision of 
Article III. “[P]erhaps the most important of these doctrines” is 
standing.2 To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that he has 
suffered or will suffer an injury in fact, that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the defendant, and that the injury will be “redressable by 
a favorable ruling.”3 
According to the Court, the “single basic idea” underlying 
Article III standing is “separation of powers.”4 The Court has 
identified several ways in which standing protects the separation of 
powers. First, it preserves the balance of power envisioned by the 
founders by confining the federal courts to the historical role of the 
courts.5 Second, standing ensures that the federal judiciary does not 
 
 1. U.S CONST. art. III, §	2, cl. 1. 
 2. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
 3. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
 4. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752); see also, 
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“The law of Article 
III standing	.	.	.	is built on separation-of-powers principles	.	.	.	.” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1146)). 
 5. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (citing Lujan v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992)). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2017) 
2017] ARTICLE III STANDING 675 
resolve matters more appropriately addressed by the elected branches 
of the federal government.6 Third, standing protects the legitimacy of 
the federal courts by allowing them to act only when necessary to 
protect rights.7 Fourth, standing prevents Congress from enacting 
laws enabling individuals to assume the President’s power of “tak[ing] 
Care that the laws [are] faithfully executed.”8 
But if Article III standing exists only to protect these principles 
of separation of powers, standing law is overbroad. Although 
standing must be established in every case brought in federal court,9 
not all cases present equal threats to the separation of powers. The 
risk to separation of powers varies from suit to suit, depending on the 
identity of the parties, the rights asserted, and the remedies sought. 
Some suits do raise separation of powers concerns that may support 
the application of standing law. This group includes suits brought by 
private individuals seeking to force the President or Congress to 
exercise its powers—such as a suit against Congress trying to force it 
to enact a particular law. It also includes suits seeking to enforce a law 
whose enforcement is entrusted to another branch of the federal 
government—such as suit by an individual seeking to enforce a 
federal criminal law.10 
But other suits do not threaten the separation of powers in ways 
that justify the application of standing law. For example, a suit by a 
private individual seeking to vindicate a private right does not 
threaten the power of Congress or of the President; instead, it falls 
squarely within the core power of the courts “to decide on the rights 
 
 6. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146–47 (“The law of Article III standing	.	.	.	serves to 
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political 
branches.” (citations omitted)); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) 
(“[Standing] is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))). 
 7. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (stating that standing helps to maintain the “public 
confidence essential to” the judiciary (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
188 (1974))). 
 8. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
II, §	3). 
 9. See F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 
57, 75 (2014) (explaining how courts have imposed the same standing requirements in all 
types of “cases” or “controversies” under Article III); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 (1994). 
 10. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). 
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of individuals.”11 Nor are separation-of-powers concerns present 
when an individual seeks to force a state official to act or to enforce a 
state law whose enforcement is entrusted to a state official—such as a 
state criminal law. Whether an individual may seek to enforce a state 
power entrusted to a state official raises questions about the 
appropriate allocation of power within the state. It also raises 
potential questions about the allocation of power between the federal 
and state governments. But it does not threaten the powers of the 
President or Congress.12 
Scholars have challenged whether separation of power is—or 
should be—the basis for standing doctrine.13 They have also 
extensively criticized the Court’s vision of separation of powers in 
developing standing.14 But none has examined whether the theories of 
separation of power given by the Court to justify standing support 
applying standing doctrine to all cases.15 This question is of central 
importance. The legitimacy of a doctrine, and the decisions it 
produces, depends in large part on the doctrine being the product of a 
process of “reasoned elaboration.”16 
 
 11. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 
(1803)). 
 12. See Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 454–55 (2013) 
(citing Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2674 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) 
(arguing that federalism principles, instead of separation of powers, should have guided 
the Supreme Court’s standing analysis in Hollingsworth, in which proponents of a ballot 
initiative banning same-sex marriage in California were denied standing to challenge a 
district court ruling that declared the referendum unconstitutional); cf. Hessick, supra note 
9, at 91–95 (arguing that federal standing doctrine should not apply in state law diversity 
cases because they do not threaten the separation of powers). 
 13. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 91–
101 (2012); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 635, 649 (1985). 
 14. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 284–85 (1990); Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1310 
(1976); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
1915, 1940–41 (1986); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 436–49 (1996); Jonathan R. Siegel, A 
Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 95–108 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s view of 
separation of powers as unjustifiably restrictive of judicial power); Steven L. Winter, The 
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1363–
73 (1988). 
 15. For an argument that standing is not effective at implementing the Court’s vision 
of separation of powers, see generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008). 
 16. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1455, 1465–66 (1995). 
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This Article assesses the justifications for Article III standing and 
establishes the extent to which that doctrine should apply. It argues 
that if separation of powers provides the only foundation for standing 
law, a plaintiff should be required to establish standing only in those 
suits that pose a threat to the separation of powers. These suits 
comprise actions by individuals seeking to force another branch of the 
federal government to exercise its powers, and suits seeking to 
enforce a law whose enforcement is entrusted to another branch of 
government. 
But in other suits, establishing standing is unnecessary to protect 
the separation of powers,17 and in those suits, courts should dispense 
with the standing inquiry altogether.18 These suits include actions by 
individuals to enforce their private rights—that is, individual rights 
such as the common-law right to be free from trespass and the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable government searches 
and seizures.19 Establishing standing should likewise be unnecessary 
in actions seeking to vindicate state interests. These include suits by 
individuals seeking to force the state government to comply with the 
law or to exercise one of its powers, as well as individual suits seeking 
to exercise powers of the state governments (such as enforcing a state 
criminal law). Neither private actions nor state-interest actions 
threaten the separation of powers because they do not implicate the 
powers of the President or Congress. Accordingly, if Article III 
standing rests on separation of powers, establishing standing is 
unnecessary in those cases. 
Eliminating standing from these categories of suits would not 
fundamentally alter the role of the federal judiciary. Historically, 
standing was not a requirement in federal courts. Courts created 
 
 17. Although this Article focuses only on standing, the argument could be extended 
to other justiciability doctrines, such as ripeness and mootness, because those doctrines 
also enforce the scope of the federal judiciary’s power under Article III. See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of mootness, 
ripeness, and political question all originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ 
language	.	.	.	.” (citing Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 
(2003))). 
 18. The argument in this Article is limited to suits brought by individuals. It does not 
address suits brought by states. Although the arguments in this Article likely could be 
extended to challenge the application of Article III standing requirements to state suits, 
considerations about the extent to which the states should be allowed to assert the 
interests of their citizens, especially in suits against the United States, complicate the 
analysis. See generally Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 387 (1995) (discussing the considerations underlying state standing doctrines). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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standing as a separate requirement only in the twentieth century.20 
Before that time, whether a plaintiff could proceed with a suit 
depended on whether she had invoked the appropriate form of action 
and was entitled to relief under that action.21 In order to maintain an 
action in federal court, plaintiffs must still satisfy this requirement, in 
addition to establishing standing, by demonstrating that they are 
entitled to relief.22 
At the same time, dispensing with standing in private-rights and 
state-interest suits would have at least two important consequences. 
First, it would remove an unnecessary obstacle to obtaining judicial 
relief in those suits. Second, it would improve standing law. Many 
commentators have criticized standing as incoherent and confusing.23 
One reason for this incoherence is that the same standing test applies 
to all cases, but courts have applied that test differently depending on 
whether the case actually raises separation-of-powers concerns. 
Eliminating standing from cases that do not threaten the separation 
of powers would significantly reduce these inconsistencies. It would 
also likely strengthen standing’s protection of separation of powers 
because there would be less dilution of the doctrine through decisions 
in cases that do not threaten the separation of powers. 
This Article argues that, if we accept the Court’s claim that 
separation of powers provides the sole rationale for standing, 
standing law should not apply in all cases, or even most cases. Instead, 
it should apply only to those suits that seek to enforce a federal public 
right or to vindicate a federal public interest. This Article proceeds in 
four parts. Part I provides an overview of standing’s development and 
its current requirements. Part II describes the separation-of-powers 
justifications underlying standing doctrine. It identifies four different 
principles underlying standing doctrine. Part III explains how these 
separation-of-powers rationales underlying standing do not apply to 
cases seeking to enforce private rights or to cases seeking to enforce 
state interests. Accordingly, it argues, courts should not apply 
standing law to those suits. Instead, standing’s application should be 
limited to suits in which an individual seeks to use the judiciary to 
 
 20. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224–28 
(1988) (tracing the history of standing). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing dismissal of a complaint that fails to 
state a claim for relief). 
 23. Bandes, supra note 14, at 227–29; Fletcher, supra note 20, at 221–24 (1988); 
Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public 
Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2001); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury 
in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008). 
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exercise functions assigned to Congress or the President. Part IV 
discusses the implications of changing standing in this way, explaining 
how it would both remove the obstacle of standing in cases in which 
the standing inquiry is unnecessary and reduce the inconsistencies in 
standing law. 
I.  THE LAW OF STANDING 
Standing is one of several doctrines that implements the 
“[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies” provision in Article III.24 Under 
current law, to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he 
has suffered, or will imminently suffer, an “injury in fact.”25 That 
injury must be “concrete” and “particularized,” and must be to a 
“judicially cognizable interest.”26 The plaintiff must also show that the 
injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant and that it will “likely [] 
be redressed” by a favorable court decision.27 If a plaintiff fails to 
meet these requirements, the federal court must dismiss the case for 
lack of jurisdiction.28 
Although decisions ground standing doctrine in the “cases” or 
“controversies” provision of Article III, the Constitution does not 
define those terms. Nor does the Constitutional Convention yield any 
insights into their meaning.29 Thus, instead of flowing naturally from 
the text of Article III, standing has developed over the years through 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2, cl. 1. Article III standing is not the only standing 
doctrine. There are also judicially created prudential standing doctrines, which Congress 
may override, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975), though the Court recently 
indicated that it could discard those doctrines, see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 & n.3 (2014) (abrogating zone-of-interest test and 
questioning other prudential standing doctrines). Although this Article focuses on Article 
III standing, its argument extends to prudential standing insofar as those prudential 
doctrines also protect the separation of powers by preventing courts from “decid[ing] 
abstract questions of wide public significance even [when] other governmental institutions 
may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention 
may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2686 (2013) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500). 
 25. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth, 422 U.S. at 
508; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972)). 
 26. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
 27. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). 
 28. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 
 29. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) (stating that Article III limits courts to resolving disputes only of “a 
Judiciary Nature”). 
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judicial opinions in a common-law-like process.30 According to the 
Supreme Court, the “single basic idea” informing this doctrinal 
development is “the idea of separation of powers.”31 The role of 
standing is to ensure that the judiciary does not usurp the role of the 
legislative and executive branches by limiting the circumstances under 
which the judiciary can act.32 
Standing has not always been viewed as essential to the 
separation of powers. Indeed, standing did not flourish as an 
independent doctrine limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
until the early 1900s.33 Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
justified standing through various instrumental and normative reasons 
in addition to separation of powers.34 It has said, for example, that the 
injury necessary to support standing increases the quality of the 
decision-making process both by ensuring that the plaintiff has 
adequate incentive to litigate and by providing context that forces the 
court to be aware of the impact of its decision.35 It has also suggested 
 
 30. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (acknowledging that Article III “concepts have gained 
considerable definition from developing case law”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 
U.S. 388, 401 (1980) (“[J]usticiability doctrine[s are] of uncertain and shifting contours.” 
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968))); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–04 
(1961) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court “evolved” the various justiciability 
doctrines); Hessick, supra note 9, at 62 (“[T]he Court has provided meaning[] to [Article 
III] on a case-by-case basis through a common-law-like process that focuses on the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in the federal system.”).  
 31. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752); see also, 
e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). 
 32. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102. 
 33. Hessick, supra note 23, at 290. Scholars disagree about whether separation of 
powers was the original motivation for standing doctrine. Some scholars argue that it was, 
contending that standing developed to protect progressive legislation from judicial review. 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 218 (2000) (“Justice Louis Brandeis and then-
professor Felix Frankfurter developed standing to shield progressive regulatory programs, 
culminating in the New Deal, from attack in the federal courts	.	.	.	.”); see Winter, supra 
note 14, at 1374. Others have argued that standing originated as a tool to manage 
caseloads. Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing 
Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
591, 638 (2010). 
 34. This is not to say that the Court deemed separation of powers irrelevant to 
standing. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1982) (listing separation of powers and other reasons for 
standing); see also Ho & Ross, supra note 33, at 650 (stating that empirical studies suggest 
that by the 1940s separation of powers motivated standing). Though on occasion the Court 
has disclaimed separation of powers as the basis for standing. See, e.g., Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
at 396 (1980) (“The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the 
action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems	.	.	.	.” (quoting Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1968))).  
 35. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. 
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that standing protects the autonomy of those most likely to be 
affected by a judicial order because it restricts judicial access to those 
whose rights have been violated instead of third parties.36 But since 
1984, the Court has rejected these other bases for standing, stating 
that separation of powers is the “single” idea underlying standing.37 
Moreover, the ways in which standing protects the separation of 
powers have changed over time. In the 1940s, courts understood 
standing as applying only in a suit “by a citizen against a government 
officer.”38 Since that time, standing has been expanded to provide 
broader protections of the separation of powers. 
For example, the Court has limited the types of injuries that 
qualify for standing.39 The Court has said standing cannot rest on an 
injury to an individual’s interest in having the government comply 
with the law.40 According to the Court, that injury is a “generalized 
grievance” that is “undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of 
the public.’	”41 Thus, redressing that injury is not “the business of the 
courts” but is instead for “the political branches.”42 For a plaintiff to 
have standing, she must suffer a distinct, concrete harm beyond that 
experienced by the general public.43 For the same reason, the Court 
has held that, except for in a limited class of suits based on the 
establishment clause,44 a federal taxpayer’s complaint about the 
 
 36. See id. at 473 (“[S]tanding also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those 
persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order.”); see also Lea Brilmayer, 
The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979) (elaborating on the argument). Unlike with 
separation of powers, these considerations are not constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (describing the adversarial 
requirement as “prudential”). 
 37. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built 
on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also, e.g., Susan B. Anthony 
v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“The law of Article III standing	.	.	.	is built on 
separation-of-powers	.	.	.	.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 
(2013))); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997). 
 38. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 39. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 296 (describing standing restrictions as resulting 
from concerns about interfering with other branches of government). 
 40. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992). 
 41. E.g., id. at 575–76 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 
(1974)); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (stating that “generalized grievances” are “most 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches” (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 499–500 (1975))); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014) (confirming that restriction on generalized grievances is 
constitutional, not prudential). 
 42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
 43. Id. at 575–76. 
 44. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968). 
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government’s misuse of tax dollars does not constitute an “injury in 
fact.”45 According to the Court, the interest of the taxpayer is “the 
interests of the public at large.”46 
Likewise, the Court has imposed limits on standing to seek relief 
from future injuries.47 The Court has said that future injuries support 
standing only if the threat of injury is “real.”48 Similar worries about 
interfering with the other branches of government have driven the 
creation and shape of the traceability and redressability requirements 
of standing.49 
Because separation of powers underlies Article III standing, 
most recent Supreme Court decisions shaping standing have involved 
suits in which a private individual sues to force another branch of the 
federal government to act or to abstain from acting—the type of suit 
that most clearly raises separation-of-powers concerns.50 But the 
application of standing is not limited to those types of cases. Standing 
applies in all suits brought in federal court, even suits that do not 
obviously affect the other branches of the federal government.51 
Accordingly, federal courts have held that an individual must 
establish standing when he is suing for the violation of an individual 
right against another private actor, even though those suits do not 
implicate the elected branches of the federal government. For 
example, in Silha v. ACT, Inc.,52 students who took college entrance 
exams administered by American College Testing, Inc. (“ACT”) sued 
ACT, claiming that ACT deceived them and unjustly enriched itself 
by selling personal information about the test takers.53 The Seventh 
 
 45. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 
(2007) (denying standing to taxpayers challenging use of federal funds to promote “faith-
based initiatives”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1952) 
(dismissing taxpayer action as alleging generalized grievance). 
 46. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 600. 
 47. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 48. E.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citations omitted). 
 49. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1066 
(2015) (arguing that the traceability and redressability prongs developed during the 
1970s). 
 50. See id. at 1105 (“The formative cases in the Supreme Court’s development of its 
tripartite standing formula mostly involved private suits against the government and its 
officials.”). 
 51. See Pushaw, supra note 9, at 448 (explaining how courts have imposed the same 
standing requirements in all types of “cases” or “controversies” under Article III).  
 52. 807 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 53. Id. at 171–72. 
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Circuit denied standing, concluding that the plaintiffs had not alleged 
that they lost anything of value from ACT’s misconduct.54 
Courts have likewise concluded that an individual must establish 
standing when suing state actors for a violation of individual rights. 
For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,55 Adolph Lyons sought 
an injunction barring Los Angeles police officers from using a 
potentially life-threatening chokehold, arguing that the chokehold 
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.56 
Although the suit did not threaten the other branches of the federal 
government, the Court denied standing on the ground that it was 
mere “speculation” that Lyons would be subjected to a chokehold in 
the future.57 
Similarly, federal courts have held that individuals lack standing 
to force state governments to comply with the law. For instance, in 
Lance v. Coffman,58 four Colorado citizens filed a federal suit 
challenging a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court upholding a 
court-drawn redistricting plan.59 They argued that the court-drawn 
plan violated the elections clause of the U.S. Constitution, which 
assigns the power to draw congressional districts to state 
legislatures.60 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing, concluding that they alleged only an “undifferentiated, 
generalized grievance” that the Colorado government had failed to 
follow the elections clause.61 
So too, federal courts have required plaintiffs defending state 
laws to establish standing. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,62 the official 
proponents of a California state referendum banning same-sex 
marriage sought to appeal a ruling of the district court declaring the 
 
 54. Id. at 174–75. For another example, see Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1544–45 (2016) (requiring private plaintiff to establish Article III standing in suit against 
private individuals). 
 55. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 56. Id. at 98. 
 57. Id. at 108. 
 58. 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (challenging People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 
(Colo. 2003) (en banc)). 
 59. Id. at 438. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 442. For other examples, see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 
2334, 2338 (2014) (applying federal standing doctrine to constitutional challenge to Ohio 
law); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011) (denying standing 
to taxpayers who raised establishment clause challenge to an Arizona law granting a tax 
credit for donations to religious schools, explaining that standing generally cannot be 
based on taxpayer status). 
 62. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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referendum unconstitutional.63 The Supreme Court of California had 
held that the official proponents were “authorized under California 
law to appear and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity 
and to appeal [the] judgment invalidating the measure.”64 But the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the proponents lacked standing.65 The 
Court explained that the proponents had alleged only a generalized 
grievance—that the district court wrongly struck down the 
referendum—and that the California court’s declaration that the 
proponents could assert the state’s interest did not change the 
analysis.66  
II.  THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS RATIONALES OF STANDING 
The Court’s claim that standing is necessary to protect the 
separation of powers is deceptively simple. Separation of powers is an 
extremely abstract concept.67 It generally refers to ensuring that the 
respective branches of government do not infringe on the other 
branches of government, but that sweeping concept does not say how 
the powers should be allocated. Therefore, as Professor Elliott has 
explained, the Court has not relied on the abstract concept of 
separation of powers in discussing standing; instead, it has identified 
several different principles of separation of powers in discussing 
standing.68 
The Court has noted at least four ways that standing protects the 
separation of powers.69 The first three focus on the power of the 
judiciary. First, standing doctrine maintains the balance of power 
envisioned by the founders because it confines the federal courts to 
 
 63. Id. at 2660. 
 64. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011). 
 65. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666. 
 66. Id. (“[T]he authority	.	.	.	‘to assert legal arguments in defense of the state’s interest 
in the validity of the initiative measure’	.	.	.	.	is by definition a generalized one	.	.	.	.” 
(quoting Perry, 265 P.3d at 1029)); see also Greenbaum v. Bailey, 781 F.3d 1240, 1241 
(10th Cir. 2015) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing of private committee seeking to 
defend constitutionality of a provision of the Albuquerque charter). 
 67. Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of 
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 301 (1989) (“[S]eparation of powers 
frustrates analysis because of its abstract dimensions.”). 
 68. See Elliott, supra note 15, at 467–68. 
 69. Professor Elliott identifies three strands of separation of powers that standing 
promotes: (1)	ensuring that the dispute before the court is concrete and adverse, 
(2)	preventing courts from making decisions better left to the political branches, and 
(3)	preventing Congress from conscripting the courts to circumvent the Executive. Id. at 
468. The four theories of separation of powers that this Article identifies differ in 
significant respects from Professor Elliott’s categories. 
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the historical role of the courts.70 Second, standing doctrine ensures 
that the federal judiciary does not decide matters more appropriately 
addressed to the other branches of government.71 Third, standing 
protects the legitimacy of the federal courts by restricting their ability 
to act to when it is necessary to protect the rights of individuals.72 The 
fourth way that standing preserves the separation of powers focuses 
on Congress: standing protects the President from the threat of 
Congress enacting laws that confer executive power on private 
individuals.73 Although they often overlap, these four categories are 
distinct justifications for standing. 
A. Limiting Courts to Their Historical Role 
According to the Court, Article III confers on the federal courts 
the power to decide only those disputes “traditionally amenable to, 
and resolved by, the judicial process.”74 In the Court’s view, courts 
traditionally resolved only “concrete, living contest[s] between 
adversaries,”75 and standing enforces this limitation.76 On this view, 
 
 70. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). 
 71. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013). 
 72. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982). 
 73. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). Scholars have identified five 
goals served by separation of powers: (1) promoting efficiency by allocating specific tasks 
to institutions designed to complete those tasks; (2) promoting accountability for 
particular acts by specifying which institution has that task; (3) increasing the likelihood 
that law furthers the common good by having different constituencies participate in its 
development; (4) increasing the impartial administration of the law by preventing 
prosecutors from serving as judges in each case; and (5) preventing tyranny by 
accumulation of power. W. B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 127–28 (1965). The Court has not identified which of these goals 
standing promotes. It seems apparent that standing prevents accumulation of power. But 
whether it promotes other goals is less clear. For example, one may argue that standing 
increases the impartial administration of justice by discouraging the courts from exercising 
the functions of the other branches, but that is not obviously correct because restricting 
judicial involvement may undermine impartiality by leaving some disputes to executive 
resolution. And standing is contrary to some of these goals. For example, standing seems 
to not promote the common good, because it limits an avenue for contributing to the 
development of the law. 
 74. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 
(1911)). 
 75. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted); see Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the 
Constitution restricts [the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts [of] 
redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused 
by	.	.	.	violation of law.”); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting the historical basis for the personal stake 
requirement). 
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standing law protects the other branches from the courts by allowing 
federal courts to exercise only those powers that they had at the 
nation’s founding.77 
The Anglo-American legal system traditionally distinguished 
between public and private rights.78 Private rights were rights held by 
individuals. Included among these rights were the rights to personal 
security, life, and property; the right to enforce contracts;79 and 
whatever other private rights the legislature created for individuals.80 
The victim of a violation of a private right could seek a judicial 
remedy for that violation by bringing the appropriate legal or 
equitable form of action, such as a writ of trespass.81 Those actions 
were meant to provide recourse for the violation of a right, but they 
 
 76. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102–03. 
 77. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492–93 (“[L]imiting the judicial power	.	.	.	to the traditional 
role of Anglo–American courts,	.	.	.	.	‘is founded in concern about the proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’	” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))). Despite the Court’s claim, it is not true that standing confines 
courts to their historical role. Historically, individuals could invoke courts to vindicate 
their rights. See infra text accompanying notes 187–89. And for most of the twentieth 
century, whether a person had standing depended on whether he alleged the violation of a 
“legal right.” E.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 
(1939). But since 1970, standing has turned on whether the plaintiff suffered a factual 
harm, not a violation of legal rights. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970). 
  Moreover, the Court has generally rejected the argument that Article III confines 
the federal courts to the role of courts in 1789. For example, historically, courts could not 
enter declaratory judgments; they could enter judgments for coercive remedies like 
damages or an injunction. But in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 
(1937), the Court held that federal courts could issue declaratory judgments, explaining 
that Article III “did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only 
possible means for presenting a case or controversy[.]” Id. at 240 (quoting Nashville, 
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933)). 
 78. Hessick, supra note 23, at 279–86 (discussing the distinction in early English and 
American cases). 
 79. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *117–41 (discussing “absolute” 
private rights to life liberty, and property); id. at *119 (discussing “relative” private rights 
acquired by “members of society”); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 
1 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (“The absolute rights of 
individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal 
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.”).  
 80. See Stephens v. McCargo, 22 U.S. 502, 512 (1824); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 694 (2004) 
(“[L]egislatures have considerable power to create new rights and to redefine existing 
rights in ways that affect whether they are public or private.”). 
 81. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, TRACTS, CHIEFLY RELATING TO THE ANTIQUITIES 
AND LAWS OF ENGLAND 15 (3d ed. 1771) (discussing “[t]he remedial [part of law]; or 
method of recovering private rights, and redressing private wrongs”). 
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were distinct from the rights they protected.82 A person could suffer a 
violation of a private right yet not be able to obtain relief because of 
limitations on the action.83 A successful plaintiff could obtain 
damages to compensate for the violation of his rights or an injunction 
to prevent the violation. 
Enforcement of public rights was more complicated. Public rights 
were those held by the general community,84 such as the right to be 
free from violations of the criminal laws and to navigate the public 
highways.85 The violation of a public right was a public wrong. 
Accordingly, the remedies for violations of these rights, which 
included civil and criminal penalties, were primarily aimed at 
vindicating the public interest instead of offsetting the losses to 
individuals.86 
Because actions brought to vindicate those public rights were in 
the name of the public, the representative of the people (such as the 
king) was a proper prosecutor to vindicate public rights.87 But the 
sovereign could authorize other individuals to vindicate public rights 
on behalf of the public. Thus, for example, early state and federal 
laws authorized a private individual to seek redress for a public harm, 
even if he had not suffered any personal harm, through a qui tam 
action.88 Under those actions, an individual would bring suit on behalf 
of the government for damages and would receive a portion of the 
penalty paid to the government as a bounty.89 Similarly, in many U.S. 
states and in England, private individuals could bring criminal 
prosecutions.90 Moreover, in several states, disinterested individuals 
 
 82. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 
784–86 (2004). 
 83. Id. at 786 (“[I]f no form of action afforded judicial relief, there was no remedy 
regardless of whether it could be said that there was a right.”). 
 84. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *5 (referring to “the public rights and duties 
due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate 
capacity”). 
 85. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *2; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 
693, 695.  
 86. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 693 (“[L]ike public law more generally, 
penal law focuses on vindicating the claims of the public rather than on compensating 
individuals.”). 
 87. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *2.  
 88. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–76 
(2000) (detailing history); Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694. 
 89. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694. 
 90. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–16 (1994) (discussing historical development of the 
private prosecutor). 
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could seek a writ of mandamus to enforce the public right to the 
performance by government officials of their duties.91 
With the exception of qui tam actions, private enforcement of 
public rights was not as broad in the federal system. Unlike in the 
states and England, the federal system did not authorize private 
prosecutions. After the Judiciary Act of 1789 established federal 
district attorneys to prosecute criminal violations, private individuals 
had no power to prosecute under federal criminal laws.92 Although 
the federal courts did not resolve whether an uninjured individual 
could seek a writ of mandamus to compel officers to obey the law,93 in 
other contexts, the Court limited private actions to enforce a public 
right. For example, an individual could not bring suit for a public 
nuisance;94 that action belonged to the government alone. If an 
individual suffered a “special” harm from that nuisance, she could 
bring a private action to vindicate her right against a private nuisance; 
but she could not bring suit to vindicate the public right.95 
If the purpose of standing is to confine federal courts to their 
historical role, this historical backdrop suggests that an individual 
should lack standing to enforce a federal public right—such as 
ensuring federal government compliance with the law—unless 
Congress has authorized the action (as with a qui tam action) or the 
individual has suffered a distinctive harm that actually converts the 
 
 91. See, e.g., People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65–67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). 
See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 708–09 (identifying states authorizing the 
practice). Scholars have disagreed about whether England allowed disinterested parties to 
seek writs of mandamus. Compare Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a 
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 822–25 (1969) (arguing that under early 
English practices third-party strangers could seek mandamus), and Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 171–72 (1992) (same), with Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English 
Prerogative Writs: The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001, 1043–47 (1997) 
(arguing that “mandamus was not available to ‘disinterested strangers’	”). 
 92. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, §	35, 1 Stat. 
73, 92–93 (1789); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 203, 209 (1842).  
 93. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 710 (noting that federal courts did 
not resolve the issue). 
 94. Id. at 703. 
 95. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 564–66, 
626 (1851). Notably, some cases suggest that injuries that would suffice for standing today 
would not have supported a private nuisance action. For example, to support standing, an 
injury may be a mere “trifle,” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)), but to support a 
private challenge to a nuisance, the injury must be a “substantial, and not merely a 
technical, or inconsequential, injury,” Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 565, 580 
(1842). 
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action to an effort to vindicate a private right (as with private 
nuisance). Some decisions limiting Article III standing for individuals 
seeking to enforce federal public rights roughly hew to this line. For 
example, in United States v. Richardson,96 a taxpayer brought suit to 
force Congress to publish an accounting of its receipts and 
expenditures, as required by Article I.97 In denying standing, the 
Court made clear that it viewed the accounting clause as imposing a 
structural requirement on Congress, not as conferring an individual 
right to an accounting.98 The denial of standing thus comfortably fits 
with the view that historically individuals could not enforce public 
rights without sovereign authorization, because neither Congress nor 
the Constitution authorized individual suits to enforce the accounting 
clause. Moreover, the Richardson Court suggested that the taxpayer 
would have standing if he had suffered a distinctive harm.99 That 
conclusion is consistent with the historical practice of recognizing that 
an individual who suffers a distinctive harm may have suffered the 
violation of a private right that mirrors a public right. 
But other decisions less comfortably follow the historical rule. In 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,100 for example, the Court denied 
standing for concerned citizens who brought suit under the 
Endangered Species Act, which authorizes “any person” to sue to 
force government officials to comply with the Act.101 Although 
legislatures historically could authorize private enforcement of public 
rights, the Court reasoned that the right to government compliance is 
a public right and that Congress cannot authorize individuals to 
enforce public rights in the courts.102 This is not to say that the 
decision in Lujan was incorrect. Some other separation-of-powers 
argument may justify the decision in Lujan. But the historical 
argument does not justify Lujan’s conclusion. 
B. Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches 
A separate function of standing is to ensure that the federal 
judiciary stays within the “proper—and properly limited—role of the 
 
 96. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	9, cl. 7. 
 98. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–77. 
 99. Id. at 180 (stating that a “particular, concrete injury” would support standing 
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972))). 
 100. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 101. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §	1540(g)(1)(A) (2012); Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 578. 
 102. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
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courts in a democratic society.”103 In this role, standing allows courts 
to operate in their appropriate sphere as courts, but prevents 
individuals from using the courts to address matters that should be 
left to the political branches.104 
There is disagreement on the appropriate role of the courts in a 
democracy. Some have argued that the function of the federal courts 
is only to provide remedies for violations of rights.105 Under this 
“dispute resolution” model,106 the role of the federal courts is not to 
expound on constitutional or other legal questions or to police the 
other branches of government.107 Courts may engage in these 
functions, but only in the course of resolving a dispute arising from 
the violation of rights.108 Others have rejected that model as too 
narrow in favor of the broader “special functions” model.109 Under 
this model, the role of federal courts is not only to remedy violations 
of rights, but also to articulate constitutional values and ensure 
government compliance with the law.110 
For its part, the Court has adopted the narrower dispute 
resolution model in fashioning standing.111 This understanding of the 
 
 103. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). 
 104. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (“The law of 
Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent 
the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” (citing 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009))); Elliott, supra note 15, at 475 
(“Here standing [asks] whether	.	.	.	a plaintiff is bringing an issue to the court that, even if 
susceptible to judicial resolution, is more properly answered elsewhere.”). 
 105. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the 
Constitution restricts [the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American 
courts	.	.	.	[of] redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to 
persons caused by	.	.	.	violation of law.”). 
 106. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73 (6th ed. 2009). 
 107. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1363, 1365 (1973). 
 108. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 492 (“Except when necessary in the execution of that 
function, courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action.” 
(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992))); Herbert Wechsler, The 
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (“Federal 
courts	.	.	.	pass on constitutional questions because	.	.	.	they must decide a litigated issue 
that is otherwise within their jurisdiction	.	.	.	.”). 
 109. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 73; Bandes, supra note 14, at 284; 
Monaghan, supra note 107, at 1368–71. 
 110. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 106, at 73. 
 111. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (limiting standing to 
plaintiffs who seek redress for their injuries). Although the dispute resolution model 
underlies standing, several other justiciability doctrines rest on the special functions 
model. See Hessick, supra note 9, at 64–65 (providing examples). 
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role of the judiciary provides a core foundation for the current 
concrete-injury requirement of standing. According to the Court, 
restricting standing in suits by private individuals to only those 
individuals who suffer a concrete individualized injury ensures that 
the judiciary stays within its “province	.	.	.	to decide on the rights of 
individuals”112 and does not address “abstract questions of wide public 
significance” that are more appropriately addressed to the political 
branches.113 Accordingly, individuals lack standing to seek judicial 
relief for “generalized grievance[s]” that are “undifferentiated and 
‘common to all members of the public.’	”114 Based on this reasoning, 
the Court has denied standing for individuals claiming to have been 
injured by the failure of the government to obey the law, stating that 
a person’s interest in seeing the government obey the law is a “public 
interest” shared by all citizens.115 Similar reasoning undergirds the 
denial of taxpayer standing to challenge the legality of government 
spending.116 
Under the Court’s view of the appropriate role of the courts, the 
restriction on suits alleging generalized grievances makes some sense. 
Generalized grievances involve injuries shared collectively by the 
public. In a democracy, the people as a whole should address 
collective harms.117 They may do so through the election of 
representatives tasked to handle general societal problems. Allowing 
individuals to sue whenever they disagree with the outcomes of this 
process would circumvent that democratic process by allowing one 
person to dictate how the people should govern themselves. 
On this view, a person should not have standing to sue to force 
Congress to enact or repeal a law simply because she thinks it would 
result in a better society. Nor, as the Court has held, should an 
individual have standing to sue the Executive based simply on a 
 
 112. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 
(1803)). 
 113. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)); see also 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (stating that “[v]indicating the public interest	.	.	.	is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive”). 
 114. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 
302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)) (citation omitted). 
 115. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
 116. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 
(2007) (denying taxpayer standing because the interest of the taxpayer is the “the interests 
of the public at large”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 
(1952) (dismissing taxpayer action as alleging generalized grievance). 
 117. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 893, 896–97 (1983). 
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desire that the Executive enforce a particular law.118 The Executive 
cannot enforce all the laws all the time because of finite resources. 
One consideration in casting a vote for a presidential candidate is 
which laws he will enforce against whom. Allowing a private suit to 
challenge those decisions would undermine that election process and 
shift the power of allocating resources from the President to the 
courts.119 
One might argue that claims of concrete harms are also better 
suited for the political branches if many people have suffered the 
same type of harm. Justice Scalia once espoused this view.120 He 
argued that when a majority of people share an injury, that group may 
resort to the majoritarian political process for relief.121 Judicial relief 
is appropriate only to protect individuals who suffer particular 
injuries that distinguish them from the majority because those 
individuals cannot depend on the political process.122 On this view, 
even if a person alleges a concrete, individualized injury, she should 
be denied standing if a substantial number of others suffered similar 
injuries. For example, if an individual faced a substantial risk of 
getting cancer from the emission of toxic waste, he would not have 
standing to seek to enjoin the emission if every other person in the 
country faced a comparable risk. Instead, he would have to seek a 
political remedy. 
Even if the political process is equipped to handle widespread 
injuries,123 it is not a judicial usurpation of the powers of the political 
branches for the courts to hear those claims—at least not under the 
 
 118. E.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (denying standing to an 
individual seeking to force the State to enforce criminal laws). 
 119. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 41 (1984). 
 120. Scalia, supra note 117, at 895–97. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. It is hardly clear that the political process is well suited to remedy widespread 
injuries because of collective action problems. A rational person who suffers even a 
significant widespread harm may choose not to spend his time and money securing a 
political remedy because others who were also injured may seek to obtain that political 
redress. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 101. The problems are worse when the injury to each 
person is relatively minor so that the cost to each person of obtaining redress exceeds the 
benefits. The court system has the class action to deal with similar problems, but no 
equivalent exists for political remedies. Brian J. Shea, Note, Better Go It Alone: An 
Extension of Fiduciary Duties for Investment Fund Managers in Securities Class Action 
Opt-Outs, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 255, 261 (2015). Further hampering a political 
remedy for widespread harm is that, if the challenged act conferred substantial benefits on 
a small group, that group is likely to have strong incentives to seek political support to 
maintain the benefit. Siegel, supra note 14, at 101–02. 
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Court’s view of the appropriate role of the judiciary in a democracy. 
That is because, even though many people suffered similar injuries, 
each individual suffered an individualized injury, and the core 
function of the judiciary, in the Court’s view, is to provide remedies 
for concrete, individualized injuries.124 A person who suffers a burn in 
a fire thus should have standing even if the fire burned many others.125 
Moreover, in suits invoking statutory and constitutional rights, 
vindicating those rights does not result in the courts displacing the 
political branches because the political process created the law that 
provides the basis for relief.126 
It is therefore unsurprising that the Court has not denied 
standing based solely on the widespread nature of an injury. To the 
contrary, it has consistently concluded that the number of people 
harmed has no bearing on standing.127 Indeed, allowing judicial 
recovery for widespread harm is the basis for class actions.128 To be 
sure, there have been several decisions in which one might argue the 
Court did deny standing based on widespread, concrete harm. For 
example, in Allen v. Wright,129 the Court held that the stigma black 
plaintiffs suffered from the IRS’s failure to prevent discrimination 
against other blacks was not a basis for standing to sue the IRS.130 
Although that stigma seems to be a concrete and personal injury, the 
Court did not deny standing on the ground that the stigma was too 
widespread of an injury. Instead, it concluded that the injury was 
“abstract” and that recognizing standing would transform the courts 
 
 124. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 125. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126. See Chayes, supra note 14, at 1314 (“For cases brought under an Act of 
Congress	.	.	.	. [t]he courts can be said to be engaged in carrying out the legislative will, and 
the legitimacy of judicial action can be understood to rest on a delegation from the 
people’s representatives.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public 
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1473 (1988). 
 127. See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, 
though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’	” (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989))); accord id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (“[T]he fact that particular environmental 
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of 
legal protection through the judicial process.”). 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §	1753.1 (3d ed. 2005) (providing an overview of 
the purpose of class actions). 
 129. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 130. Id. at 755–56. 
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into “a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned 
bystanders.”131 
In short, standing protects the other elected branches by barring 
individuals from bringing suit simply to challenge the way that the 
other branches of government have exercised their power. But it does 
not prohibit individuals from bringing suit, even suits that seek to 
force the other branches to act, when they seek relief for personal, 
distinctive harms that they have suffered. 
C. Protecting Legitimacy 
The Court has suggested a third way that standing doctrine 
protects the separation of powers: it prevents the judiciary from 
weakening by protecting its legitimacy. The Court has intimated that 
the legitimacy of the federal judiciary depends on establishing for the 
public that courts act out of necessity to protect individual interests 
instead of out of the judges’ desire to achieve particular policy 
goals.132 Requiring plaintiffs to establish standing helps achieve that 
goal.133 As Justice Stevens explained, limiting judicial action to when a 
plaintiff has demonstrated standing ensures the courts do not simply 
“engage in the business of giving legal advice,” which would “chip 
away a part of the foundation of [the judiciary’s] independence 
and	.	.	.	strength.”134 
This argument is not that standing doctrine is compelled by 
Article III and therefore it would be illegitimate for courts not to 
 
 131. Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Similarly, in Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., the Court held that the 
psychological distress caused by the government’s illegal conduct is not an adequate injury 
to support standing. 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); see also Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 
497, 541 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that global warming was not a 
“particularized” injury because it “is a ‘phenomenon harmful to humanity at large’	” 
(quoting Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in judgment))). 
 132. E.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (suggesting that the “public confidence” in the 
courts depends on the courts “refrain[ing] from passing upon the constitutionality of an 
act [of the representative branches] unless	.	.	.	the question is raised by a party whose 
interests entitle him to raise it” (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))). 
 133. Id. (stating that standing helps to maintain the “public confidence essential to” the 
judiciary (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell J., 
concurring))). 
 134. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 103 (1978) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that standing helps to ensure that the 
judiciary is “held to account” by revealing “what persons or groups are invoking the 
judicial power, the reasons that they have brought suit, and whether their claims are 
vindicated or denied”). 
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require plaintiffs to establish standing. Rather, the argument is that 
the legitimacy of the judiciary depends on the acceptance of its 
actions by the public,135 and acting only when a plaintiff has standing 
increases the likelihood of public acceptance of judicial decisions.136 
It is doubtful that federal standing law is essential to maintaining 
judicial legitimacy. To start, it is unlikely that the public has a clear, 
consistent opinion about when the judiciary should act. Further, as 
Paul Bator has written, “[t]he judicial power is neither a Platonic 
essence nor a pre-existing empirical classification.”137 Many states, 
which are not bound by Article III,138 have adopted models in which a 
personal stake is not a prerequisite to invoking the judicial power.139 
In Utah, for example, plaintiffs may have standing when there is no 
other person better situated to bring suit.140 And many states waive 
standing requirements in cases raising important public interests.141 
Nothing suggests that these state doctrines strip the courts of those 
 
 135. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (stating that standing helps to maintain the 
“public confidence essential to” the judiciary). 
 136. Public acceptance of government action is one well-recognized means of securing 
legitimacy. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1795 (2005) [hereinafter Fallon, Legitimacy] (stating governmental institution has 
legitimacy when “the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise 
deserving of support”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: 
An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 589 (2001) [hereinafter 
Fallon, Stare Decisis] (arguing that norms can acquire legitimacy through social 
acceptance). 
 137. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990); see also Helen Hershkoff, State 
Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1833, 1911–13 (2001) (arguing that there is no single concept of the judicial power). 
 138. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article 
III do not apply to state courts	.	.	.	.”). 
 139. See Hessick, supra note 9, at 66–68 (gathering different standing tests from 
different states). 
 140. Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (explaining that a party 
proves its appropriateness “by demonstrating that it has the interest necessary to 
effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual 
questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing” 
(quoting Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 
2006))). 
 141. See, e.g., Vill. Rd. Coal. v. Teton Cty. Hous. Auth., 298 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2013) 
(relaxing standing in cases of “great public interest” (quoting Maxfield v. State, 294 P.3d 
895, 900 (Wyo. 2013))); Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 
2005) (en banc) (same); Nebraskans Against Expanded Gambling, Inc. v. Neb. 
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n, 605 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Neb. 2000) (noting 
“great public concern” exception for standing (citing Cunningham v. Exon, 276 N.W.2d 
213, 215 (Neb. 1979))). 
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states of their legitimacy.142 To the contrary, broad judicial access may 
improve public regard for state courts insofar as it allows broader 
access to justice, provides private individuals with an avenue for 
participating in public decision making, reduces the political power of 
interest groups, and provides a means for combatting governmental 
inaction because of political realities.143 
Indeed, federal justiciability doctrines themselves do not 
subscribe to a single vision of the appropriate role of the courts. 
Although the dispute resolution model underlies standing and most 
other justiciability doctrines, other justiciability doctrines rest on the 
broader special functions model.144 For example, under the “capable 
of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine, 
a court will not dismiss a claim that is otherwise moot if there is a 
reasonable probability that the defendant will again engage in the 
complained-of conduct.145 In that situation, the plaintiff no longer has 
a real stake in the case—an order favorable to the plaintiff will not 
provide him with tangible relief—yet courts have nevertheless 
concluded that they may resolve the dispute.146 More generally, the 
justiciability doctrines do not limit the scope of issues that federal 
courts address. Federal courts regularly write dicta about important 
issues unnecessary to resolving the disputes before them.147 There is 
no indication that these practices have undermined the legitimacy of 
the courts. Indeed, to the extent one hears complaints about the 
legitimacy of federal courts in the context of standing, they tend to be 
that the denial of standing illegitimately insulates wrongdoers from 
answering for their actions in court and results in the withholding of 
judicial remedies,148 and that standing doctrine discriminates by 
 
 142. See, e.g., Ben Winslow, Utah Court System Has 93% Approval Rating, Chief 
Justice Boasts, FOX 13: SALT LAKE CITY (Jan. 27, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://fox13now.com
/2014/01/27/utah-court-system-has-93-approval-rating-chief-justice-boasts/ [https://perma.cc
/L7MN-WXSY] (reporting that Utah courts have a ninety-three percent approval rating). 
 143. Hershkoff, supra note 137, at 1917–19, 1922, 1927. 
 144. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998). Although the Court has often 
described the exception as applying when the particular plaintiff might reasonably again 
experience the threatened conduct, see id., in several cases the Court has applied the 
exception without regard to whether the issue would arise again between the same parties. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 187 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). 
 146. Similarly, although federal courts forbid “feigned” suits today, in the past those 
suits were allowed to proceed. See, e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34 
(1804) (resolving dispute involving only “a feigned issue”). 
 147. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1269–71 (2006) (noting the widespread practice of issuing dicta). 
 148. See, e.g., Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism: Expanding 
Access to Judicial Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73, 78 (2014) 
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systematically favoring regulated entities over regulatory 
beneficiaries.149 
More importantly, judicial legitimacy likely depends more on the 
substantive issues before the court and the way that the court decides 
those issues than on whether the plaintiff has standing. People tend to 
be most interested in cases that touch on divisive social issues or 
challenge the actions of law enforcement officers and other 
government officials, and they are quickest to condemn the decisions 
in those cases with which they disagree.150 Korematsu v. United 
States,151 Dred Scott v. Sandford,152 and the 1930s decisions striking 
down New Deal legislation153 are obvious examples. 
To be sure, some decisions that generate cries of illegitimacy 
present serious questions of justiciability. Bush v. Gore,154 in which 
the Court stopped a recount of ballots submitted in Florida for the 
presidential election, resulting in the election of George W. Bush as 
President, provides an example.155 There is a serious question whether 
the dispute involved a non-justiciable political question.156 But most 
criticisms of the decision have focused on the equal protection 
analysis instead of the justiciability of the case.157 
 
(claiming that “standing doctrine illegitimately insulates the IRS—and, by extension, other 
federal agencies—from accountability for the harmful consequences of their rulemaking 
decisions”). 
 149. See Elliott, supra note 15, at 488–89; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for 
Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304, 324–28 (2002) (arguing 
that standing “systematically favors the powerful over the powerless”). 
 150. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 96 (arguing people complain about “cases in which 
the Court has been at its most adventurist in discovering constitutional constraints that are 
not textually obvious, in striking down the work of political actors, in reforming long-
standing social practices”). 
 151. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 152. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 153. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 3 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 495 
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act); see WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE TIME OF ROOSEVELT 161–62 (1995) (discussing discontent flowing from these 
decisions). 
 154. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 155. Id. at 111. 
 156. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 275–77 
(2002) (arguing that the case presented a political question). 
 157. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT 
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 174 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme 
Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 589 
(2001). See generally Fallon, Legitimacy, supra note 136, at 1816 (noting this focus of 
criticism). But see Barkow, supra note 156, at 275–77 (criticizing the decision on political 
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By the same token, people are likely to approve of decisions with 
which they agree, even if there are serious doubts about whether the 
court had the power to render the decision. For example, Republican 
approval of the Supreme Court went up twenty points after the 
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.158 
The claim that standing is essential to protect legitimacy is 
further undermined by the fact that public interest, and thus the 
possibility that the public will care enough to reject a decision, tends 
to increase as a case progresses up the appellate hierarchy and the 
precedential effect of the decision increases.159 Accordingly, if 
standing is aimed at protecting legitimacy, its requirements should 
vary depending on the court hearing the claim. But they do not do so; 
the same standing test applies in district courts, circuit courts, and the 
Supreme Court.160 
None of this is to say that standing never helps to protect judicial 
legitimacy. There could well be serious claims of illegitimacy because 
of judicial overstepping if courts allowed private individuals to 
exercise government functions, such as initiating prosecutions or 
dictating the content of federal legislation. Allowing an individual to 
choose who should be prosecuted could result in arbitrary and 
vindictive prosecutions;161 likewise, empowering an individual to set 
 
question grounds). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), provides another example. The 
decision in that case expanded “the capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to 
mootness, see id. at 125; Hessick, supra note 23, at 327 n.316, but the criticisms of the 
decision generally focus on the substantive decision that there is a fundamental right to 
abortion, not the exercise of judicial power, see, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922 (1973) (listing substantive 
criticisms). 
 158. See KARLYN H. BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. 
POLICY RESEARCH, AEI PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 9–10 (2012), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/-possupreme-
courtjune-20122_162919650849.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC5F-PQN9]. 
 159. See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1020 (2007) (noting greater sociological legitimacy concerns 
in Supreme Court opinions than in decisions of lower courts); see also ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 118, 198 (2d ed. 1986) (focusing his “passive virtues” argument on the Supreme 
Court because “the lower courts can act in constitutional matters as stop-gap or relatively 
ministerial decisionmakers only”); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—
and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2006) (“[A]lthough concerns about government 
by judiciary need not be restricted to or focused on the Supreme Court, in practice the 
Court is the most frequent object of worries about judicial activism	.	.	.	.”). 
 160. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615–16 (1989) (applying the injury-in-
fact test for standing to proceed in Supreme Court). 
 161. Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 781, 816–17 (2009). 
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federal legislation could result in the promulgation of self-interested 
laws that lack majority support.162 But outside these contexts, standing 
plays little role in protecting judicial legitimacy, and in any event, 
these legitimacy concerns are not the ones identified by the Court. 
Of course, standing could be refashioned to protect the public 
attitude toward the judiciary. Alexander Bickel argued that the 
Supreme Court should use standing and other jurisdictional doctrines 
to avoid deciding controversial questions to preserve its legitimacy.163 
But the standing doctrine envisioned by Bickel is not a constitutional 
one commanded by the separation of powers; instead, it is a 
discretionary one that the Court may invoke when it deems it prudent 
to do so.164 
D. Constraining the Power of Congress 
The Court has asserted that, aside from its role in constraining 
the courts, standing prevents Congress from impairing the executive 
power through the creation of private actions. Article II of the 
Constitution vests the executive power in the President,165 and it 
imposes on the President the obligation to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”166 Relying on these provisions, the Court 
asserted in Lujan that the Executive alone has the power to decide 
how public law should be enforced and that Article III standing 
protects this executive function.167 At issue in Lujan was the citizen-
suit provision of the Endangered Species Act authorizing private suits 
to force the government to comply with the Act. Although the 
provision authorizes “any person” to sue,168 the Court held that only a 
person who has suffered an injury conferring standing could bring suit 
under the law.169 The Court explained that allowing anyone to sue to 
 
 162. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (prohibiting delegation of 
legislative power to private entity); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: 
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1362 (1995) (“[S]tanding 
forces	.	.	.	non-Condorcet minorities to seek codification of their preferences into law in 
the legislature.”). 
 163. BICKEL, supra note 159, at 122–23. 
 164. See id. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. II, §	1. 
 166. Id. art. II, §	3. 
 167. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). The Court has expressly 
stated, however, that Article II is not the basis for standing. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (“[O]ur standing jurisprudence[,] though it may 
sometimes have an impact on Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not Article 
II.”). 
 168. 16 U.S.C. §	1540(g)(1) (2012). 
 169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
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ensure executive officers’ compliance with the law would effectively 
transfer from the President to the courts the power to execute the 
laws, thereby converting the courts into “virtually continuing 
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”170 
If one accepts the position that the Executive has the exclusive 
power to vindicate the public interest,171 the Court’s worries in Lujan 
are legitimate. For every executive action—be it a prosecutorial 
decision, a rulemaking, or a proclamation of a national holiday—
there are individuals whom the action has upset. If Congress could 
authorize any person to use the courts to oversee executive actions, 
the Executive would become effectively subservient to the courts. 
Standing protects against this threat by limiting the class of people 
that Congress can authorize to challenge executive action. 
That said, more recent decisions suggest that a majority of the 
Court is no longer fully committed to the view that only the Executive 
can vindicate the public interest. For example, in Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,172 the Court held 
that private individuals had standing by statute to seek civil penalties 
paid to the United States against a factory that violated the Clean 
Water Act.173 As several dissenting Justices noted, allowing private 
individuals to seek public remedies arguably impairs the power of the 
President to enforce the law.174 Moreover, in Vermont Agency of 
National Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,175 the Court upheld 
the standing of private individuals suing as qui tam relators on behalf 
of the United States for fraud against the government.176 Although 
relators do not suffer harm themselves, the Court reasoned that they 
have standing based on an assignment from the United States of its 
 
 170. Id. at 577. 
 171. Commentators have challenged this theory. See Elliott supra note 15, at 500 
(arguing that standing does not reliably protect the President from Congress); Leah M. 
Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1337 (2015) (arguing that the 
take care clause does not confer exclusive authority on the President to vindicate the 
public interest); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 
DUKE L.J. 1141, 1142–43 (1993) (“The decision is difficult to square with the language and 
history of Article III, with the injury requirement itself, with more modest visions of 
judicial power, and with time-honored notions of public law litigation.”). 
 172. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 173. Id. at 186–88. 
 174. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority approach 
“marr[ies] private wrong with public remedy in a union that violates traditional principles 
of federal standing—thereby permitting law enforcement to be placed in the hands of 
private individuals”). 
 175. 592 U.S. 765 (2000). 
 176. Id. at 787. 
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injury from the fraud.177 But under that reasoning, the relator is suing 
to enforce a right traditionally enforced by the government. 
These decisions suggest that, in some circumstances, the 
Executive does not have the exclusive power to vindicate public 
interests. But the effect of these decisions should not be overstated. 
Nothing in these decisions suggests that the Executive does not have 
exclusive power to vindicate other public interests, such as how to 
enforce the criminal law. But they do establish that, for at least some 
public interests, executive enforcement need not be exclusive and 
therefore that standing does not serve the function of protecting the 
Executive from Congress. 
III.  TAILORING STANDING 
The various considerations of separation of powers undergirding 
standing may justify imposing standing requirements in suits by 
private individuals seeking to exercise the powers of other branches 
of the federal government or to force those other branches to use 
those powers. But, as this Part explains, those separation-of-powers 
concerns do not extend to suits between private individuals seeking to 
enforce private rights, nor do they apply to suits that seek to enforce 
state public rights or to exercise the powers of state institutions. 
Federal standing doctrine accordingly should not apply in those suits. 
A. Private Suits Asserting Private Rights 
The distinction between public and private rights still exists.178 
Like their historical counterparts, private rights are those held by 
individuals. These rights may derive from the common law, as with 
the right to be free from trespass by others on one’s land. They also 
may be created by Congress, as with the right not to be subject to 
racial discrimination by motels.179 The Constitution also confers 
various private rights. Although most constitutional provisions are 
structural in that they dictate the scope of federal power or prescribe 
the procedures for federal action, some provisions, such as the Fourth 
Amendment restriction on unreasonable government searches and 
seizures,180 confer rights on individuals. 
 
 177. Id. at 773. 
 178. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 286. 
 179. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §	201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 
243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	2000a (2012)) (“All persons shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the	.	.	.	accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation	.	.	.	without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race	.	.	.	.”). 
 180. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Causes of action provide the means for vindicating private rights. 
But those actions are distinct from the rights they protect.181 Rights 
entitle individuals to be treated a particular way; a cause of action is 
the mechanism to vindicate a right.182 Not all private causes of actions 
enforce private rights. For example, the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”) requires agencies to follow particular procedures when 
promulgating rules.183 The Act does not confer on individuals the 
“right” to have agencies follow these procedures,184 but it does 
authorize “aggrieved” individuals to file suit if the agency has not 
followed them.185 In other words, the APA creates a private cause of 
action under which individuals may vindicate a public interest. 
Under current doctrine, for all suits, both those seeking to 
vindicate private rights and those seeking to vindicate public rights, 
an individual must establish standing by demonstrating an injury in 
fact.186 Individual actions seeking to vindicate public rights may raise 
the separation-of-powers concerns discussed above. But none of those 
concerns apply to suits by private individuals seeking to vindicate 
private rights. Accordingly, courts should not require plaintiffs 
seeking to vindicate private rights to establish standing. 
1.  History 
As previously explained, establishing standing was not 
historically a prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief for the violation 
of a private right. An individual could maintain an action to enforce 
her private rights simply by invoking the appropriate form of action 
and establishing that she was entitled to relief under that action. A 
plaintiff’s failure to invoke a cause of action resulted in the dismissal 
of his suit, as did the plaintiff’s failure to prove that he was entitled to 
relief under that action.187 
 
 181. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 483 (2008) (stating that rights are 
distinct from actions). 
 182. John F. Preis, How the Federal Cause of Action Relates to Rights, Remedies, and 
Jurisdiction, 67 FLA. L. REV. 849, 850 (2016) (“A right is a claim to receive certain 
treatment, and the cause of action is a tool for enforcing that claim in court.”). 
 183. 5 U.S.C. §	553 (2012). 
 184. Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (stating that the 
Communications Act creates a cause of action to force agencies to follow procedures but 
does not “create new private rights” to those procedures). 
 185. 5 U.S.C. §	702 (2012). 
 186. See supra notes 25, 51 and accompanying text. 
 187. Garland v. Davis, 45 U.S. 131, 145 (1846) (allegations are subject to demur if 
“wrong in form”). 
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These dismissals were not for lack of jurisdiction, as is the case 
today for dismissals for lack of standing;188 instead, they were 
decisions on the merits.189 If a plaintiff failed to show that he was 
entitled to relief under his action, the court would not dismiss on the 
ground that the court lacked the power to determine whether the 
plaintiff was entitled to relief. Rather, the dismissal was simply on the 
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was entitled to 
relief. 
These deficiencies continue to be a basis for dismissal in federal 
court today. A plaintiff asserting her rights in federal court today still 
must establish that her rights have been violated and that a cause of 
action entitles her to relief for that violation.190 The failure to do so 
results in dismissal for failure to establish a claim to relief.191 
To be sure, the law provides private rights today that did not 
exist in the past. For example, individuals have a right against 
securities fraud that goes beyond the protections of the common 
law.192 But these rights are still private rights in that they are held by 
individuals to protect personal interests,193 and the failure to establish 
a personal violation of those rights is a basis for dismissal.194 
Because plaintiffs in today’s federal judicial system must still 
meet the historical requirements for maintaining suit, standing 
doctrine is not essential to confining the federal judiciary to its 
historical role in suits seeking to enforce private rights. 
2.  Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches 
The concern that the judiciary might usurp the power of the 
political branches also does not support imposing standing in private 
suits seeking to enforce private rights. By definition, claims that allege 
violations of individual rights fall squarely within the Court’s view of 
the judiciary’s “province” of “decid[ing] on the rights of 
 
 188. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998) (stating that 
when a plaintiff “lacks standing” the courts “lack jurisdiction”). 
 189. Compare 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *301 (pleas for lack of jurisdiction), 
with id. at *293–300 (pleas challenging sufficiency of the action).  
 190. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n.** (1990) (explaining that a 
person may recover only for violation one’s of own rights, not those of a third party). 
 191. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 192. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (“Judicially 
implied private securities fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-
law deceit and misrepresentation actions.” (citations omitted)). 
 193. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) 
(recognizing a private right against securities fraud). 
 194. See Broudo, 544 U.S. at 343 (dismissing securities action for failure to state a 
claim). 
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individuals.”195 They do not seek to decide “abstract questions of wide 
public significance” that should be directed to the political 
branches.196 
Nor does a private suit seeking to vindicate a private right seek 
to use the courts to exercise a power reserved to the other branches. 
Those suits do not ask courts to exercise the legislative power of 
Congress. To the extent they involve legislation at all, they seek to 
enforce rights that Congress has already created.197 Similarly, those 
suits do not threaten the President’s Article II power to enforce the 
law. Article II empowers the President to enforce public federal rights 
in his capacity as the representative of the public.198 It does not 
authorize him to enforce private rights held by private individuals.199 
As John Marshall put it, a “private suit instituted by an individual, 
asserting his claim to property, can only be controlled by that 
individual. The executive can give no direction concerning it.”200 
 
 195. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
 196. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). 
 197. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 1472 (arguing that claims seeking to enforce 
statutes do not usurp the political process because “the political resolution” is already 
“expressed in law”). To be sure, resolving a suit alleging the violation of a federal 
statutory right depends on the interpretation of a federal statute, and interpreting a statute 
presents a potential interbranch conflict because the Court’s theory of interpretation 
depends on its perception of the judiciary’s relationship with Congress. John F. Manning, 
Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (stating that 
the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain “what Congress actually decided or, in the 
terms of the trade, ‘intended’	”). But that conflict is not the kind of threat to separation of 
powers against which standing seeks to guard. Standing seeks to prevent individuals from 
using the courts to address social issues, not determine how courts should interpret 
statutes. The theories of statutory interpretation, which separation of powers also informs, 
handle that issue. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2001). 
 198. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (stating that “[v]indicating the public interest	.	.	.	is the 
function of Congress and the Chief Executive”). 
 199. Cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 
(1982) (stating that the States cannot represent the rights of individuals); Pennsylvania v. 
Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (recognizing the United States’s 
standing to challenge violations of civil rights only insofar as the violation constitutes 
“harm to interests shared by all members of the community”). 
 200. Representative John Marshall, Speech Delivered to the U.S. House of 
Representatives on the Resolutions of the Honorable Edward Livingston, Relative to 
Thomas Nash, Alias Jonathan Robbins (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 82, 99 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984) (1799–1800); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 291 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) 
(stating that the right of “taking reparation [for violation of private right]	.	.	.	belongs only 
to the injured party”) (emphasis removed).  
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To be sure, the political branches can take steps to remedy the 
violation of a private right. For example, Congress may enact private 
legislation providing relief for the complaining party—such as a 
statute directing the Treasury to disburse money to the 
complainant.201 But that legislation does not vindicate the right that 
has been violated; it creates a new entitlement for the beneficiary.202 
Perhaps Congress could also enact legislation authorizing the 
Executive to bring suit on behalf of an individual to seek a remedy for 
the violation of that individual’s private rights.203 The right to be 
enforced, however, would still be the private right held by the 
individual. In bringing suit to vindicate that right, the Executive 
would not be acting in its capacity to enforce public rights under 
Article II; instead, it would be acting as a representative of the 
individual whose right she seeks to vindicate, comparable to a 
guardian bringing suit on behalf of its ward.204 
Congress could also create a public right, held by the 
government, prohibiting the same conduct underlying violation of the 
private right. The creation of that public right would not destroy the 
private right held by the person injured by the tortfeasor.205 (Of 
course, Congress might be able to abrogate the private right 
altogether. But in that case, the suit would no longer involve a private 
right.) An individual could still bring suit to vindicate that private 
right without interfering with the President’s power to enforce the 
law.206 
Because a party asserting private rights does not present a 
relevant threat to the powers of Congress or the President, for those 
 
 201. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (“Private bills in 
Congress are still common, and were even more so in the days before establishment of the 
Claims Court.”). 
 202. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (noting that private bills create 
entitlement to compensation). 
 203. But see LOCKE, supra note 200, at 291 (stating that the right of “taking reparation 
[for violation of private right]	.	.	.	belongs only to the injured party” (emphasis removed)). 
Such a statute would not be barred by restrictions on third-party standing, because third-
party standing is a prudential doctrine that can be “abrogated by Congress.” Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). 
 204. See, e.g., 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward §	1 (2008) (defining a guardian as 
one appointed to care for the property interests of the ward). 
 205. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 696 (explaining that malfeasance 
potentially gives rise to both criminal actions and tort actions). 
 206. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *118 (explaining that violent torts are 
“always attended with some violation of the peace for which in strictness of law a fine 
ought to be paid to the king”). 
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types of claims, standing doctrine is not necessary to protect Congress 
or the President.207 
One might argue, even if standing is unnecessary in suits to 
enforce private statutory or common law rights, it is nevertheless 
essential for claims challenging the constitutionality of an act of 
another branch of the federal government. That is because a 
determination of unconstitutionality effectively results in the court 
revising the actions of the other government branch.208 A ruling that a 
federal law is unconstitutional results in the court voiding 
congressional legislation and telling Congress the limits of its 
legislative power;209 similarly, a determination that an executive 
officer’s action was unconstitutional effectively enjoins the Executive 
from using its power as it sees fit in the future.210 Concerns of this sort 
have prompted the Court to say that the “standing inquiry [is] 
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute” and 
entails deciding “whether an action taken by one of the other two 
branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”211 
These concerns may justify a rigorous standing requirement for 
claims invoking structural provisions of the Constitution, such as the 
requirements that laws must pass both houses of Congress to be 
valid212 or that a federal law be justified by an enumerated power in 
the Constitution, such as the commerce clause.213 Those provisions do 
not confer a right on any individual but instead establish how the 
branches of government should operate and the limits of its power.214 
 
 207. Suits against private individuals may implicate important federal interests—for 
example, the liability of private actors performing government contracts. See Boyle v. 
United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). But the presence of a federal interest does 
not suggest that the federal courts should be more hesitant to act. To the contrary, 
protecting a federal interest is reason for more aggressive federal judicial intervention. 
Indeed, federal courts have offered the presence of a federal interest as a justification to 
create federal common law. See id. at 504–06 (holding that important federal interest 
justified creation of federal common law). 
 208. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 152 (1893) (arguing that judicial review gives 
“judges	.	.	.	the power to revise the action of other departments”). 
 209. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the 
constitution is void[.]”). 
 210. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 635–36 (2002) (holding unconstitutional 
search supported by probable cause but conducted without warrant). 
 211. E.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (discussing the 
purpose of standing doctrine). 
 212. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	7, cl. 2. 
 213. Id. art. I, §	8. 
 214. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 575–76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) (distinguishing between structural provisions and “rights”); Aziz Z. Huq, 
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Accordingly, under the Court’s vision of separation of powers, 
enforcement of these provisions should be left to the political 
branches unless an individual establishes an injury supporting 
standing.215 
But these concerns do not justify imposing a standing 
requirement on plaintiffs asserting private constitutional rights, such 
as their Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure.216 
A private right deriving from the Constitution is still a private right.217 
Such rights are held by each individual, and the violation of an 
individual’s right may provide the basis for recovery.218 Resolving 
claims asserting private constitutional rights thus falls squarely within 
the federal judiciary’s core function of deciding on rights of 
individuals. Accordingly, even though the decision may limit the 
power of Congress or the Executive, it does not involve resolving a 
dispute more appropriately addressed to the other branches of 
government.219 
To be sure, as a prudential matter, courts might want to avoid 
resolving cases that pass on the constitutionality of the actions of the 
other branches, even though they clearly have the power to do so.220 
A determination that another branch acted unconstitutionally raises 
the possibility that unelected judges are implementing their policy 
preferences instead of those enacted by elected branches.221 It also 
creates a confrontation between the branches and potentially signifies 
 
Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1514–15 (2013) (arguing that 
structural constitutional principles are not individualistic rights). 
 215. See supra notes 103–11 and accompanying text. 
 216. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
395 (1971). 
 217. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 
GA. L. REV. 343, 351–52 (1993) (discussing private rights endowed by the Constitution 
and the interests those rights protect). 
 218. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395 (affording damages remedy for violation of 
constitutional rights). 
 219. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168 (1803) (concluding that an 
injury to a private right justifies a remedy even when doing so limits powers of other 
branches). 
 220. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring) (listing instances in which courts should avoid constitutional questions in 
cases in which they possess jurisdiction); Hessick, supra note 13, at 95–96 (arguing that 
comity should be a basis for declining jurisdiction). 
 221. See Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review on the Basis of “Regime Principles”: A 
Prescription for Government by Judges, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 435, 451 (1985) (noting the threat 
that “judicial review amounts simply to law-making according to the preferences of 
unelected government officials holding office for life.”). 
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disrespect of that other branch’s judgment.222 These concerns are 
particularly acute in cases involving core executive functions, such as 
foreign affairs or the military. But these concerns do not bear on 
whether a dispute can be resolved by a federal court—that is, whether 
the dispute involves “decid[ing] on the rights of individuals”;223 rather, 
they go only to whether the court should resolve the dispute. 
Another potential objection is that, when a plaintiff seeks a 
remedy for a potential future violation of her rights, standing plays an 
important role in protecting the roles of the elected branches. 
Although courts can provide prospective relief to remedy threatened 
harms, limiting standing to those who can establish that the threat of 
injury is “real and immediate”224 confines courts to their appropriate 
role. Allowing a person to bring suit based on a remote risk of injury 
would effectively enable courts to resolve generalized grievances 
because everyone faces at least some probability of suffering a rights 
violation.225 
But as I have explained elsewhere, the separation-of-powers 
concerns underlying standing do not warrant distinguishing between 
large and small risks of harm.226 That is because any threatened 
violation of a private right is particularized. A person who faces a 
small risk of being assaulted, for example, has a personalized interest 
in preventing that assault. Setting the probability threshold extremely 
low may vastly expand the number of people who have standing. But 
each of those people has a personalized interest in not being 
assaulted.227 Because separation of powers does not justify treating 
those risks of harm differently, standing is unnecessary to weed out 
low probability risks of harm. 
Of course, saying that standing is an unnecessary inquiry in suits 
raising private rights requires one to determine whether the law 
 
 222. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (avoiding declarations of 
unconstitutionality out of “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of 
Government” (citations omitted)). 
 223. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 168). To be sure, under the political question doctrine, courts lack the power to 
address some constitutional issues. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). But 
that doctrine is limited to the few issues that the Constitution entrusts exclusively to 
another branch. See id. at 228–29. 
 224. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citations omitted). 
 225. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (arguing that “remote and speculative [claims] are properly left to the 
policymaking Branches,” because otherwise “virtually any citizen” would have standing to 
challenge government action). 
 226. Hessick, supra note 13, at 85. 
 227. Id. at 87. 
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confers an individual right or instead establishes a regulatory 
prohibition on particular action. Often it is easy to determine whether 
a law establishes an individual right or establishes a prohibition that 
protects the public interest—the Fourth Amendment, for example, 
clearly provides an individual right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,228 while the constitutional provisions regulating 
impeachment clearly outline structural limitations.229 But for other 
provisions it may not be so clear.230 The difficulty of resolving this 
question does not justify extending standing’s requirements to all 
cases; rather, it justifies requiring a plaintiff claiming that he is 
asserting a private right to establish that he is indeed asserting a 
private right and therefore need not establish standing. Moreover, 
courts regularly resolve whether particular laws confer rights or 
establish structural requirements in a number of contexts aside from 
standing. For example, courts must resolve the same question in cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §	1983, which affords a remedy against state 
officials only for the deprivation of an “individual” right under the 
Constitution,231 and pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,232 which provides analogous 
remedies against federal officials.233 Those decisions often settle 
whether a law confers a right, making it unnecessary to reconsider the 
matter.234 
3.  Protecting Legitimacy 
As explained earlier, standing is not a sensible tool to protect 
judicial legitimacy.235 Judicial legitimacy turns much more on the 
issues in a case and the way in which a court decides those issues, 
rather than whether the appropriate person raised the issue before 
the court.236 But even accepting the claim that standing protects 
legitimacy, standing is not necessary to protect judicial legitimacy in 
suits alleging the violation of private rights because those suits do not 
raise relevant concerns about judicial legitimacy. 
 
 228. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 229. Id. art. I, §§	2–3. 
 230. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 187 n.6 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (raising this concern). 
 231. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002). 
 232. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 233. See id. at 389, 396. 
 234. Id. at 388–89. 
 235. See supra notes 137–53 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 150–53. 
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Recall that the theory is that standing protects judicial legitimacy 
by indicating to the public that courts do not simply provide legal 
advice but act only when necessary to protect individual rights.237 
There is usually little public interest in run-of-the-mill tort suits 
between two private parties. Over a thousand torts suits are filed in 
federal court each year.238 Yet one does not hear about trial court 
rulings in private suits unless the suits involve a widespread injury like 
a toxic tort, the suits result in huge verdicts, or one of the parties is 
famous—much less about claims that trial decisions in private suits 
are illegitimate because of a lack of standing.239 
Suits involving private constitutional rights may garner greater 
public attention. For example, there were a number of media reports 
on the lawsuit challenging the refusal of Kim Davis, a Kentucky 
county clerk, to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.240 But 
those suits are the exception rather than the norm, given the large 
number of suits involving private constitutional rights filed each year 
that do not receive public attention.241 
More importantly, standing is simply unnecessary in suits 
alleging violations of private rights to protect judicial legitimacy in the 
sense described by the Court. In the Court’s view, the role of the 
judiciary is to act when necessary to protect individual rights.242 That 
is precisely what a court does when a person alleges the violation of a 
private right. Of course, the plaintiff will not win if she fails to 
establish that her rights have been violated. But denying relief on that 
ground does not undermine judicial legitimacy in the sense that the 
 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 132–234. 
 238. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL 
CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 
12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2013 AND 2014, at 1 (2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Mar14.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RL67-WF89]. 
 239. Searches in the “News and Journals” and “Law Reviews” databases of Westlaw 
conducted in February 2017 revealed no claims that a district court ruling in a private suit 
was illegitimate, for lack of standing or otherwise. 
 240. See, e.g., Couple Who Sued Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Marry, 6ABC (Oct. 25, 
2015), http://6abc.com/news/couple-who-sued-kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-marry/1050560/ 
[http://perma.cc/KV2P-5L3M]. 
 241. In 2014, prisoners filed over 39,000 civil rights or habeas suits and in total plaintiffs 
filed over 35,000 civil rights suits. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-2: U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 AND 
2014, at 2–3 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir
/C02Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ARD-KD24]. Although not all of these suits involved 
constitutional claims, it stands to reason that many did.  
 242. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
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court has gone beyond its appropriate sphere. In that case, the court 
has determined that an award is not necessary to protect individual 
rights. 
4.  Protecting the Executive from Congress 
Standing requirements are also not necessary in private-rights 
suits to prevent Congress from eroding the President’s Article II 
power to enforce the law. Article II authorizes the President to 
enforce public rights; it does not empower the President to vindicate 
private rights.243 
That said, as noted above, Congress may be able to authorize the 
President to enforce private rights by statute, and it certainly may 
create a public right that runs parallel to a private right.244 For 
example, Congress may enact a criminal law prohibiting breaches of 
contracts occurring in interstate commerce that accompanies the 
private action for breach of contract. But in private suits seeking to 
enforce a private instead of a parallel public right, standing is 
unnecessary to guard against congressional commandeering of 
executive power.245 
This is not to say that there are no limits on Congress’s power to 
create private rights. Congress cannot create private rights if doing so 
violates some other constitutional provision. For example, if Article II 
vests exclusive power in the President to enforce public rights, 
Congress cannot create a private right to compel the President to 
enforce public rights.246 But these limitations on Congress’s power do 
not flow from Article III. Although Lujan suggests that Article III 
prohibits federal courts from hearing private suits to enforce public 
rights even when Congress has authorized those suits,247 nothing in 
Lujan or other opinions suggests that Article III defines what 
constitutes a private right or a public right. Instead, the limitations on 
 
 243. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 
(1982) (stating that for a state to have standing, “[it] must articulate an interest apart from 
the interests of particular private parties”); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 
644 F.2d 187, 200–03 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusing to infer implied right of action for the United 
States under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce individual rights). 
 244. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 231 n.300 (“Parallel public and private remedies 
are most familiar to American law; they do not violate the Constitution.”). 
 245. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 159, 203 (2011) (arguing standing is proper for private enforcement of private rights 
but possibly not for private enforcement of parallel public right). 
 246. F. Andrew Hessick, Understanding Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 195, 205 
(2015). 
 247. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992) (contrasting between 
suits to vindicate individuals’ rights and suits to vindicate the public interest). 
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what private rights Congress may create must come from other 
provisions in the Constitution. 
B. Suits Asserting State Interests 
A second category of suits in which Article III standing is 
unnecessary are those seeking to assert state interests. These include 
suits seeking to force the state government to comply with the law or 
to exercise one of its powers, as well as suits seeking to exercise a 
power of the state governments. These “state interest” suits are the 
state analog of those federal suits that do raise the kinds of 
separation-of-powers concerns underlying standing. But they do not 
threaten the separation of powers because they do not implicate the 
other branches of the federal government; instead, the only sovereign 
interests at stake are those of the state. Accordingly, if Article III 
standing rests on separation of powers, establishing standing is 
unnecessary in those cases. 
1.  History 
State-interest suits are analogous to the historical category of 
suits seeking to vindicate public interests. Citizens of a state share a 
collective interest in protecting the state’s interests, ensuring state 
government compliance with the law, and seeing the state’s criminal 
and other public laws enforced. 
As noted above, historically, the representative of the public had 
the primary responsibility of enforcing public rights.248 But the 
legislature could authorize public rights that individuals could 
enforce.249 Although the Supreme Court has concluded that 
individuals generally cannot enforce federal public rights,250 states 
have been less restrictive about the enforcement of state public rights. 
Many states permit broad private enforcement of public rights. For 
instance, thirty-six states allow taxpayer standing,251 and a number of 
other states waive standing requirements in cases that raise an 
important public interest.252 Moreover, a number of states have 
 
 248. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 249. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 80, at 694. 
 250. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text. 
 251. Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State 
Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1277 (2012).  
 252. See, e.g., Youngblood v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C. 2013) 
(recognizing “public importance exception” (citing Freemantle v. Preston, 728 S.E.2d 40, 
43 (S.C. 2012))); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (waiving standing 
in suit of “significant public importance” (quoting Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele 
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concluded that standing is a prudential doctrine subject to 
modification by the state legislature.253 
Allowing federal courts to hear suits by private individuals to 
enforce state public rights under these state doctrines is entirely 
consistent with historical practice. It does not result in the courts 
hearing suits that they traditionally could not hear because the 
relevant sovereign has authorized private enforcement of public 
rights.254 
To be sure, one might argue that enforcing Article III standing 
doctrine is essential to limiting federal courts to their historical role 
when state law does not authorize private enforcement of public 
rights. But historically those suits would have been dismissed on the 
ground that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that he was entitled to 
the remedy requested,255 not that the court lacked the power to decide 
whether the plaintiff was entitled to the remedy.256 Federal courts 
continue to be able to dismiss suits on that ground today: a plaintiff 
cannot maintain an action under a law that does not entitle the 
plaintiff to relief.257 
More importantly, the rationale for using Article III standing to 
limit federal courts to the historical role of courts does not apply to 
cases raising state public rights. The reason for limiting federal courts 
 
County ex rel. Tooele Cty. Comm’n, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (Utah 2009))); To-Ro Trade Shows v. 
Collins, 27 P.3d 1149, 1155 (Wash. 2001) (waiving standing when “the interest of the 
public	.	.	.	is overwhelming” (quoting In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 660 (Wash. 1987) (en 
banc) (Utter, J., concurring)). 
 253. See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 
(Mich. 2010) (calling standing “prudential”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 
312 (Haw. 2007) (describing “standing doctrine” as “prudential rules of judicial self-
governance”); Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) 
(“Standing [is] a matter of self-restraint	.	.	.	.”). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88. 
 255. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Norwich & Worcester R.R., 17 Conn. 372, 376 (1845) 
(concluding that a plaintiff without special injury seeking an injunction for a public 
nuisance is “not entitled to relief”); see also Barr v. Stevens, 4 Ky. 292, 292–93 (1808) 
(affirming order relating to nuisance, as opposed to dismissing appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, on the ground that the appellants were not specially harmed) 
 256. Compare 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *219–20 (stating that “no [private] 
actions lies for a public or common nuisance”), and 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §	922 (stating that the proper 
“remedy” for public nuisance is suit by the government), with 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
79, at *301 (pleas for lack of jurisdiction), and 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §	921, (13th ed. 1886) (noting 
the “jurisdiction” of chancery courts over public nuisances). 
 257. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). One might try to extend this same reasoning to 
federal public rights. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236 (arguing that standing should 
be a merits question). 
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to their historical role is to prevent those courts from infringing on 
the domains of the other branches of the federal government.258 That 
concern does not apply to suits seeking to vindicate state public 
rights. The President does not have the power to enforce state public 
rights.259 Nor does Congress have any say over the content of state 
public rights.260 Instead, in suits seeking to vindicate state public 
rights, the only sovereign interests at stake are those of the state. 
Instead of involving separation of powers, the argument that 
federal courts should refuse to hear unauthorized private suits 
seeking to enforce state public rights sounds in federalism. Denying 
standing in those cases enforces the state arrangement of power 
among its branches of government, not the federal allocation of 
power.261 It accordingly is not compelled by the separation-of-powers 
argument underlying Article III standing. At most, those concerns 
may provide prudential grounds for a federal court to decline to hear 
a case to avoid undermining the state’s scheme for enforcing its public 
rights.262 
2.  Protecting the Democratically Accountable Branches 
Article III standing also does not serve to protect the power of 
the other federal branches of government in suits asserting state 
interests. As noted above, the enforcement of state rights or exercise 
of state powers does not implicate the powers of the President or 
Congress.263 The creation of state public rights and how those rights 
are enforced are decisions solely for the state. Accordingly, for those 
state law disputes, standing is not necessary to protect the other 
branches of the federal government. 
One might argue that the Article III standing doctrine 
nevertheless is necessary to prevent judiciary encroachment of the 
 
 258. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) (“[L]imiting the 
judicial power	.	.	.	to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts	.	.	.	.	‘is founded in 
concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic 
society.’	” (quoting Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))) 
 259. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to 
control enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated). 
 260. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (holding that Congress 
cannot direct enactment of state laws). 
 261. Hessick, supra note 9, at 101 (stating that federal justiciability doctrines “enforce 
the federal allocation of power” that “[m]any states have rejected”). 
 262. Cf., e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (directing federal courts to 
abstain from issuing injunctions barring state criminal prosecutions); La. Power & Light 
Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959) (requiring abstention in cases that implicate an 
important “sovereign prerogative” and in which state law is unclear). 
 263. See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text. 
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elected branches of the state governments. That argument is based on 
federalism instead of separation of powers. It seeks to avoid federal 
interference with the state’s administration of its affairs,264 instead of 
seeking to define the allocation of power among the branches of the 
federal government.265 
The Supreme Court has not invoked federalism as a rationale for 
standing; instead, it has insisted on grounding standing in separation 
of powers even in suits that raise only federalism concerns. For 
example, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,266 
the Court denied taxpayer standing to challenge a state tax.267 It 
explained that “[t]he legislative and executive departments of the 
Federal Government, no less than the judicial department, have a 
duty to defend the Constitution”268 and therefore the federal courts 
lack “unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of 
[state] legislative or executive acts.”269 
This conclusion is a non sequitur. That the President and 
Congress have a duty to defend the Constitution has no bearing on 
the relationship between the federal courts and the states. Article III 
standing enforces the federal allocation of power among the courts, 
Executive, and legislature.270 That effort to protect the division of 
federal powers does not translate into protecting federalism. Many 
states have adopted distributions of power among their governmental 
departments that differ from the federal arrangement.271 Some states 
do not place all executive power in a single office but instead disperse 
it among several elected officials; some allow direct participation of 
their citizens through popular referenda; and some confer more 
power on their judges because those judges are subject to elections.272 
Because of these differences and others, various states have 
 
 264. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (stating federalism refers to state 
and national governments as “joint participants in the governance of the Nation” 
(citations omitted)). 
 265. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (“The doctrine of separation of 
powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three coequal 
branches of our Government.”). 
 266. 563 U.S. 125 (2011). 
 267. Id. at 130. 
 268. Id. at 133 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3). 
 269. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)). 
 270. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that justiciability “define[s] the role 
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the 
President, and Congress). 
 271. See Hershkoff, supra note 137 at 1886–96. 
 272. See id. (giving examples of states with these characteristics). 
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developed different standing doctrines, and many of these doctrines 
allow for broader enforcement of public rights.273 Applying Article III 
standing to suits seeking to enforce state public rights therefore does 
not faithfully protect the decisions of the state about when an 
individual may appropriately invoke the judicial power.274 
Far from undermining federalism, dispensing with Article III 
standing in private suits seeking to enforce state public rights may 
promote federalism. Imposing federal standing requirements in those 
cases may prohibit suit when the state would permit it. Applying 
federal standing doctrine interferes with these state schemes for 
directing which institution―the judiciary or a political body—should 
decide particular disputes. 
The Article III restriction on taxpayer standing for state 
taxpayers provides an example. As noted earlier, most states allow 
taxpayer standing to challenge unlawful activity.275 Various reasons 
justify that decision. The states may have concluded that allowing 
private enforcement actions is the best way to vindicate the public 
right to government compliance with the law, or that private 
enforcement is essential for providing an avenue to challenge 
unlawful actions that do not hurt anyone in particular. But federal 
courts have refused to apply those state taxpayer standing rules, and 
instead have held that state taxpayer status does not confer Article III 
standing.276 Prohibiting those taxpayers from proceeding in federal 
court undermines the state’s interest in allowing those suits.277 It 
impairs the enforcement of state interests in federal court. 
 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 251–52. 
 274. Although justiciability doctrines do not seek to promote federalism, courts may 
use justiciability doctrines to protect state interests. See Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 
919 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that justiciability doctrines were not created with 
federalism in mind, but explaining that justiciability could nevertheless be used to further 
federalism). But that practice does not establish that standing is designed to protect 
federalism; it shows only that courts may use the doctrine to protect federalism. See 
Hessick, supra note 9, at 102 n.303. 
 275. See supra text accompanying note 252. 
 276. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (“[W]e have likened 
state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus we have refused to confer standing upon a 
state taxpayer absent a showing of ‘direct injury[.]’	” (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952))); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683 
(9th Cir. 2001) (denying standing to California taxpayers for state law claims, despite 
acknowledging that California recognizes taxpayer standing). 
 277. Although federal standing should not apply to cases assessing the constitutionality 
of state laws, federal courts perhaps should apply state standing doctrines as a matter of 
comity to avoid unnecessary conflicts with state governments. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (invoking comity in abstaining from ruling on legality of state criminal 
proceedings). Federal courts accordingly should abstain from hearing a state case when 
state standing laws would not permit the same suit to go forward in state court. 
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The Court’s denial of standing in Hollingsworth v. Perry provides 
another example of how Article III standing may undermine state 
interests.278 There, after the executive department of California 
refused to appeal a federal district court’s ruling that Proposition 8 
was unconstitutional, the State of California explicitly authorized the 
official proponents of Proposition 8 to appeal the ruling on behalf of 
California.279 Despite that authorization, the Supreme Court held that 
the proponents lacked Article III standing to pursue the appeal.280 
That determination impaired California’s ability to pursue its 
interests. The referenda process allows the citizens of California to 
enact laws that California’s political officials refuse to enact.281 
Allowing the proponents to represent California’s interest in 
defending the law if California’s officials refuse to do so provided a 
way of preventing officials from undermining the referendum 
process.282 In other words, the Hollingsworth decision removed one of 
California’s critical mechanisms for defending the constitutionality of 
its referenda. Moreover, by denying standing to the proponents, the 
Supreme Court deprived the voters of California of a central means 
contemplated by the State of challenging the district court ruling that 
their proposition was unconstitutional.283 
One might contend that this argument justifies dispensing with 
standing in suits that raise challenges under state laws or 
constitutions, but not in suits raising federal constitutional challenges 
to state laws because constitutional determinations about state laws 
may apply to federal laws in future cases.284 This concern does not 
apply to private rights conferred by the Constitution. As explained 
above, suits alleging violations of private rights do not present a 
relevant threat to the other branches of government.285 But the 
concern may apply to structural provisions. The Constitution imposes 
several structural constraints on the states. For example, Article I, 
Section 10 prohibits the states from engaging in a handful of actions, 
 
 278. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). 
 279. Id. at 2660. 
 280. Id. at 2662. 
 281. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he initiative process is 
specifically intended to enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact 
statutes when current government officials have declined to adopt	.	.	.	the measure	.	.	.	.”). 
 282. Id. at 1024 (“The initiative power would be significantly impaired if there were no 
one to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials 
decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”). 
 283. See Elliott, supra note 12, at 446. 
 284. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (noting that 
incorporated rights apply equally to state and federal governments). 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 217–19. 
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such as entering into treaties, coining money, or keeping troops 
during peacetime except with Congress’s consent.286 But almost none 
of the structural constraints imposed on the states in the Constitution 
apply to the federal government. Some, like those in Article I, 
prohibit the states from engaging in certain acts because those acts 
are reserved to Congress;287 others oblige the states to follow certain 
procedures inapplicable to the federal government;288 and still others 
establish obligations between the states that do not apply to the 
federal government.289 The only exception is that the Constitution 
prohibits both the federal government and the states from granting 
titles of nobility.290 
More importantly, the possibility that a ruling against a state 
might establish precedent applicable against the federal government 
does not raise the kinds of separation-of-powers concerns that 
underlie Article III standing. The purpose of standing is to limit the 
occasions when federal courts may exercise the Article III “judicial 
Power.”291 According to the Court, “the ‘judicial Power’ is one to 
render dispositive judgments.”292 Judgments are the means by which 
courts resolve cases and controversies. They settle the rights and 
obligations of the respective parties. Standing assures that the dispute 
before the court is a case or controversy susceptible to resolution by a 
dispositive judgment. Standing thus “identif[ies] those disputes which 
are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”293 
 
 286. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	10. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See, e.g., id. art. II, §	1 (defining the states’ role in electing the President). 
 289. See id. art. IV, §§	1–2 (requiring each state to give full faith and credit to the acts 
of other states, and to return fugitives from another state at the latter’s request). 
 290. Id. art. I, §§	9–10. The commerce clause imposes a structural limitation on both 
the federal government and the states. It authorizes the federal government to regulate 
only interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce. Id. art. I, §	8. The dormant commerce 
clause prohibits states from discriminating against out-of-state commerce, see Comptroller 
of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015), or unduly burdening interstate 
commerce, see General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). Although the 
scope of power granted to Congress used to be tied to the scope of the limits on the states 
under the clause (whatever Congress could regulate, the states could not, and vice versa), 
see Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827), the two are no longer mirror images, see 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (noting the evolution of the 
doctrine). Therefore, determinations about one do not affect the other. 
 291. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988). 
 292. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 717 (2011) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995)). 
 293. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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Unlike the resolution of disputes through judgments, creating 
law through opinions is not an exercise of the judicial power.294 
Opinions are merely by-products of the exercise of the judicial power 
of resolving disputes.295 Their function is to provide explanations for 
the judgments that resolve cases and controversies, but opinions do 
not themselves resolve cases and controversies.296 Indeed, federal 
courts may issue judgments without opinion if they so choose.297 And 
they regularly discuss in opinions matters unnecessary to the 
judgment, even when that discussion is on constitutional issues that 
may affect the federal government in future cases.298 
Because judicial lawmaking is not an exercise of the judicial 
power, standing does not seek to limit it. It is for this reason that the 
same standing doctrine that applies in district courts applies in the 
circuit courts and the Supreme Court. Although district courts lack 
the power to create law, they exercise the judicial power of rendering 
dispositive judgments. 
3.  Protecting Legitimacy 
Suits involving the vindication of state interests often garner 
substantial public attention, at least among the residents of that state 
who may be affected by the decision. But the legitimacy of a federal 
court’s ruling in such a case does not turn on whether the plaintiff has 
Article III standing. That is not only because, as noted earlier, 
standing has little bearing on legitimacy.299 It is also because Article 
III does not limit the states,300 and many states have developed 
standing rules that differ from the federal ones or have concluded that 
 
 294. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 123, 126–27 (1999) (“[O]pinions	.	.	.	are not necessary to the judicial function of 
deciding cases and controversies.”). 
 295. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 
1006 (1965) (“Federal Courts	.	.	.	do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a 
special function vested in them to enforce the Constitution	.	.	.	. They do so rather for the 
reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and 
in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the land.”). 
 296. Hartnett, supra note 294, at 126 (“The operative legal act performed by a court is 
the entry of a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that 
judgment.”). 
 297. See, e.g., King v. Ill. Bd. of Elections, 522 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1998) (affirming lower 
court decision without opinion). 
 298. Leval, supra note 147, at 1269–73 (noting the widespread acceptance of dicta on 
constitutional issues). 
 299. See supra notes 137–64 and accompanying test. 
 300. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article 
III do not apply to state courts	.	.	.	.”). 
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it is crucial not to have a limitation on judicial power.301 Those rules 
establish the situations under which the states have deemed it 
appropriate for courts to rule on their state laws.302 Nothing suggests 
that those state rules have undermined the legitimacy of the state 
courts. To the contrary, people in those states expect judicial action 
when the state rules of justiciability are satisfied. 
One might argue that requiring a plaintiff to establish Article III 
standing to vindicate a state interest is more important to maintaining 
the legitimacy of federal courts than of state courts because a ruling 
of the federal court involves federal intrusions into state laws. That 
argument sounds in federalism instead of separation of powers and 
accordingly is not what has driven standing doctrine. Moreover, 
limiting standing to those who satisfy the Article III test as opposed 
to the state test for standing may imperil the legitimacy of the federal 
court insofar as it may be seen as the application of federal law at the 
expense of state interests.303 In Hollingsworth, for example, the denial 
of Article III standing to the proponents of Proposition 8 after the 
Supreme Court of California stated that they could defend the 
proposition on behalf of the State impaired California’s ability to 
defend its laws, no doubt upsetting those Californians who supported 
the proposition.304 
4.  Protecting the Executive from Congress 
Standing is also not necessary in suits involving state interests to 
prevent Congress from encroaching on the President’s Article II 
enforcement power. Suits seeking to vindicate state interests do not 
implicate Article II. Article II does not authorize the President to 
enforce state public rights or otherwise vindicate state interests.305 
The state has sole control over the enforcement of its laws. Because 
the President has no power to vindicate state interests, it is not 
necessary to use Article III standing to prevent Congress from 
interfering with the President’s enforcement power in those cases. 
 
 301. Hessick, supra note 9, at 66–67 (gathering different state standing rules). 
 302. See id. at 95–98 (explaining that state justiciability rules reflect state 
determinations of when adjudication is appropriate). 
 303. Cf. Todd C. Berg, Experts Say Critics of Michigan Supreme Court’s Environmental 
Law Ruling Are Wrong, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR 30394644 
(reporting criticisms of the Michigan Supreme Court for adopting restrictive standing 
requirement). 
 304. See supra text accompanying notes 278–83. 
 305. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to 
control enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated). 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
Eliminating the standing inquiry in private-rights and state-
interest suits would have at least two consequences. First, it would 
obviously prevent those types of cases from being dismissed for lack 
of standing. Second, it would reduce discrepancies in standing law and 
potentially increase the stringency of standing’s requirements in suits 
that do threaten the separation of powers. 
A. Removing the Standing Obstacle 
The most obvious effect of eliminating Article III standing 
requirements in private-rights and state-interest suits is that it would 
prevent those suits from being dismissed on standing grounds. Thus, 
standing would no longer pose an obstacle in suits in which 
individuals assert individual rights. Decisions such as City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Court denied standing to an individual 
who sought an injunction barring police from using a chokehold that 
he claimed violated the Fourth Amendment,306 would not be 
dismissed for lack of standing. Similarly, standing would no longer 
pose a bar in state taxpayer suits, like Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization v. Winn,307 or in suits seeking to defend state 
laws, like Hollingsworth v. Perry.308 
Eliminating standing as a threshold inquiry in these cases would 
remove a substantial obstacle preventing many litigants from 
obtaining the relief that they request. As many scholars have argued, 
courts often use standing to achieve particular outcomes.309 For 
example, several scholars have argued that the Court denied standing 
in Hollingsworth to avoid ruling that the Constitution obligates the 
states to recognize gay marriage.310 
Of course, dispensing with Article III standing may not change 
the ultimate outcome in many suits, because many individuals who 
 
 306. 461 U.S. 95, 106, 111–12 (1983). 
 307. 563 U.S. 125, 130 (2011). 
 308. 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661, 2667–68 (2013). 
 309. See Elliott, supra note 245, at 171–72 (recounting arguments that standing allows 
courts “to manipulate outcomes”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1999) (describing standing as a “tool[] to further [judges’] 
ideological agendas”). 
 310. See Fallon, supra note 49, at 1100 (arguing that the Court may have denied 
standing in Hollingsworth “to avoid a ruling on the merits of that case”); Michael J. 
Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
127, 146 (2013) (asserting that the Court in Hollingsworth likely avoided the constitutional 
issue because some of the Justices “were not yet prepared to impose gay marriage on the 
states”). 
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lack standing will run into other legal barriers to their claims. Most 
prominently, many individuals lack standing because they fail to state 
an actionable claim.311 To have Article III standing under current 
doctrine, a plaintiff must allege a judicially cognizable injury, and 
whether an injury is judicially cognizable turns on whether the law 
confers a right on the plaintiff to seek redress for that injury.312 If an 
injury is not judicially cognizable, it does not provide a basis for 
seeking redress. For example, the Court has denied standing to 
plaintiffs seeking information from the government under the 
expenditures clause of the Constitution,313 but found standing for 
plaintiffs seeking information from the government under the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).314 The only relevant difference 
between those decisions is that FECA provides a private right to 
information while the expenditures clause does not.315 Because the 
expenditures clause does not create a right to the information, the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to the information under the 
expenditures clause, even if standing were established. 
But dismissing those suits on the merits instead of on standing 
would have several effects. First, it would improve conceptual clarity. 
Because standing inherently involves questions about the substantive 
rights at stake,316 efforts to keep standing separate from the merits 
have resulted in standing doctrine becoming incoherent and 
confusing.317 Eliminating the standing inquiry would ameliorate this 
 
 311. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236. Another barrier applies to individuals seeking 
an injunction. A plaintiff may obtain an injunction only to prevent “a probable ground of 
possible injury.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE 
INCIDENTS THEREOF, ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA, ch. 2, §	9, at 9 (10th ed. 1892). A party who lacks standing to 
challenge a threatened injury because the risk is not “real” likely does not face a probable 
ground of injury. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 160 (1990). 
 312. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (denying standing to inmate for 
denial of access to law library, because the inmate had no right to a law library). The 
overlap between standing doctrine and the need to state a claim is unsurprising given that 
the two doctrines serve the same purpose. The function of standing is to ensure that the 
judiciary stays within its “province	.	.	.	to decide on the rights of individuals[,]” Lujan v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 170 (1803), and the function of the requirement that the plaintiff allege a claim 
entitling him to relief is to allow courts to provide relief only to vindicate individual rights. 
 313. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80 (1974). 
 314. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998). 
 315. See Hessick, supra note 23, at 306. 
 316. See Fletcher, supra note 20, at 236. 
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problem. It would also save the resources that parties spend litigating, 
and courts spend resources resolving, standing issues.318 
Second, dismissing these suits on the merits instead of on 
standing grounds could improve judicial legitimacy. Instead of being 
perceived as avoiding vindicating substantive rights through an easily 
manipulated standing doctrine,319 courts would confront the question 
about the scope of the substantive rights at issue. To be sure, 
resolving the case on the merits would not result in the plaintiff 
receiving relief, and in some circumstances, forcing courts to address 
substantive rights may result in a narrowing of those rights to avoid 
awarding intolerable remedies that they previously avoided through 
standing.320 But it would at least prevent the impression that the 
courts are trying to avoid the merits. 
Third, dismissing these suits on the merits would expand the 
power of Congress and state legislatures. Article III is a constitutional 
limitation on the courts that legislatures cannot change. But 
legislatures can define the scope of substantive rights and say who 
may enforce those rights. Thus, if a court determines that existing 
rights do not provide a basis for relief, a legislature may overturn that 
decision by creating a new right. Even when the dismissed claim is 
based on a constitutional right, a legislature can create statutory rights 
that provide broader protections than the Constitution.321 
B. Changing Standing Doctrine 
Restricting standing’s application to suits that do raise relevant 
threats to the separation of powers may also affect the content of 
standing doctrine. Currently, courts apply the same standing test in all 
 
 318. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(2011) (discussing litigation costs of unpredictable jurisdictional rules). This is not to say 
that eliminating standing from these cases would reduce total costs. Dispensing with 
Article III standing could potentially result in more federal lawsuits. Although many of 
those suits would likely be dismissed at preliminary stages for failing to state a claim, at 
least some could go forward. It is a difficult empirical question whether the extra costs of 
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 319. Pierce, supra note 309, at 1758. 
 320. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and 
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 684 (2006) (suggesting that 
expanding standing may result in constriction of rights to avoid awarding intrusive 
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 321. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015) (“Congress enacted [the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] in order to provide greater protection for 
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cases.322 But as the aphorism “hard cases[] make bad law” suggests, 
the particular considerations that drive the outcome of a case play a 
large role in shaping the doctrine produced by that case.323 Evidence 
suggests that the degree to which finding for the plaintiff would 
interfere with the other branches of the government informs the 
decision.324 For instance, Professor Fallon has argued that courts grow 
more likely to deny standing in suits against the government as the 
intrusiveness of the remedy against the government increases.325 Thus, 
standing cases that present a real, relevant threat to separation of 
powers are more likely to produce stringent standing doctrines, while 
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers are likely to 
generate less demanding doctrines.326 
Compare, for example, Northeastern Florida Chapter of the 
Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville327 
with Summers v. Earth Island Institute, Inc.328 In Associated General 
Contractors, non-minority contractors claimed that a government 
program that gave preference to minority businesses violated their 
equal protection rights.329 Although the plaintiffs could not prove that 
they would have received the contracts if race were not a factor, the 
Court held “the denial of equal treatment resulting from” the 
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preference, “not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit,” sufficed 
for standing.330 By contrast, the Court held in Summers that a group 
of environmentalists lacked standing to challenge Forest Service 
regulations that excluded certain types of projects from various 
procedural requirements.331 Like the program in Associated General 
Contractors, the regulations in Summers posed a barrier to a benefit 
desired by the plaintiffs. In the former, the plaintiffs desired the 
ability to compete equally for contracts, while in the latter they 
desired stronger environmental protections.332 Nevertheless, the 
Court held the harm in Summers was too “generalized” to support 
standing.333 The only apparent difference between the cases is that, in 
Associated General Contractors, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their 
equal protection rights, while the plaintiffs in Summers sought to 
vindicate, not their individual rights, but the public interest in 
securing government protection of the environment.334 
Because the same standing test applies in all cases, these two 
types of cases pull standing doctrine in opposite directions and 
generate inconsistencies in standing.335 Dispensing with standing in 
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers would eliminate 
many of these inconsistencies. The cases that do not threaten the 
separation of powers would no longer generate standing decisions 
that seem incompatible with decisions in cases that do threaten the 
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separation of powers. Standing law thus would become more 
coherent and predictable.336 
A second consequence is that eliminating standing from cases 
that do not threaten the separation of powers would tend to make 
standing more stringent in cases in which it still applies. That is 
because non-threatening cases would no longer generate opinions 
tending to dilute standing doctrine. The only cases addressing 
standing would be those that present the sort of threat to the 
separation of powers that standing is designed to handle, and the 
decisions in those cases would tend, over time, to create a more 
demanding law of standing than currently exists. Standing accordingly 
would apply to a narrower set of cases. But the constraints imposed 
by standing would be stronger. 
For example, in challenges to administrative regulations (which 
do not rest on private rights),337 courts might eventually curtail 
standing based on emotional or aesthetic injury, based on the 
conclusion that those injuries are inherently subjective and allow for 
broad standing to challenge government action.338 Likewise, they may 
limit standing based on injuries that plaintiffs create through their 
own deliberate actions, because of the ease of creating standing to 
challenge those actions.339 
A more stringent standing law in these areas would have at least 
two consequences. First, it would better insulate government 
decisions. That would lead to fewer government resources being 
required to fend off court challenges. It could also result in agencies 
being more willing to adopt new regulations because they are less 
likely to face successful court challenges. Further, it could lead to 
increased scrutiny of government actions by other institutions, such as 
Congress and the public, because a more stringent standing doctrine 
 
 336. Of course, it would not prevent all inconsistencies. Different theories of 
separation of powers held by different Justices create inconsistencies in standing doctrine 
in cases that do raise separation-of-powers concerns. For example, FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 
11, 13 (1998), written by Justice Breyer, who holds a broad view of standing, granted 
standing to individuals seeking information under the Federal Election Campaign Act, but 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974), written by Chief Justice Burger, who 
held a narrower view, denied standing to individuals seeking information under the 
Constitution. 
 337. See supra text accompanying notes 181–85. 
 338. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(denying standing based solely on harm caused by seeing public display of cross); Robert 
J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from 
Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 85 (2010) (“[A]esthetic” injury 
[is] an inherently subjective concept.”). 
 339. See Pushaw, supra note 338, at 94. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2017) 
2017] ARTICLE III STANDING 727 
would reduce the availability of judicial oversight, which currently 
plays a large role in constraining government action. 
Second, a more demanding standing doctrine may also increase 
the political capital of the courts. Courts depend on other 
governmental institutions to enforce their orders; if the judiciary 
enters too many disfavored decisions, those other institutions may 
refuse to enforce the orders.340 Affording greater protection for 
government decisions through more rigorous standing requirements 
reduces the opportunity for courts to render decisions unpopular with 
the other branches. Accordingly, if a court were to enter a disfavored 
order in a suit in which it did find standing under the more rigorous 
test, the other branches of government may be more willing to 
submit. 
CONCLUSION 
If separation of powers is the “single basic idea” motivating 
Article III standing,341 Article III standing is overbroad. Many suits 
do not raise the kinds of threats to separation of powers that Article 
III standing doctrine purports to combat. If we accept the Court’s 
justifications for standing, standing should not apply in those cases. 
Federal courts should skip the standing inquiry and proceed to apply 
the other substantive and procedural rules for deciding cases. 
Dispensing with standing in cases in which its rationale does not 
apply will have various benefits. It will save the resources and effort 
spent on resolving standing—which is often difficult to resolve—in 
cases in which it should not apply. It will also remove the unnecessary 
opportunity for erroneous rulings in those cases. 
Restricting the application of standing to cases in which its 
separation-of-powers reasons apply will also improve the quality of 
standing doctrine. Despite the insistence that a single standing test 
applies to all cases, standing doctrine has badly fragmented into 
different strands. That fragmentation is due in large part to different 
values and concerns influencing standing decisions.342 Removing the 
standing inquiry from cases in which standing should not apply would 
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decrease that fragmentation, thereby increasing coherence and 
consistency. Moreover, confining the standing inquiry to cases that 
actually raise salient separation-of-powers issues will have the 
tendency over time to change the doctrine so that it more accurately 
implements the purpose behind standing. Cases that do not present 
separation-of-powers concerns will no longer have a diluting 
influence on the doctrine.343 
This is not to say, however, that standing should extend to the 
cases that raise these threats to the separation of powers. Some 
commentators have strongly argued that standing should impose no 
impediment to lawsuits, even to private actions asserting public 
rights,344 or that courts should dispense altogether with standing as a 
separate jurisdictional limitation.345 But irrespective of whether 
standing should apply to those types of actions, it should not apply to 
cases that do not threaten the separation of powers. 
Of course, although the Court has said that separation of powers 
is the only consideration underlying standing, its decisions do not 
always match its rhetoric. Standing decisions often seem to reflect 
other concerns, such as protecting federalism, preserving the 
autonomy of plaintiffs, and controlling the docket size. Likewise, it is 
entirely possible that standing doctrine actually rests on a different 
conception of separation of powers than the one the Court has 
articulated in justifying standing. To the extent that courts think 
standing should be used for these reasons, the doctrine should be 
expressly reformulated to embrace those concerns. But if the Court 
firmly believes that standing exists solely to protect the separation of 
powers, as articulated by the Court, that doctrine is vastly overbroad. 
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